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Moral Rights in California
PETER H. KARLEN*
"Moral rights"for artists, while recognized in Europe and else-
where abroad, enjoy little protection in the United States. These
rights include the right to restrain excessive criticism, the right to
claim credit for one's work, and the right to maintain the physical
integrity of the work of art.
This article provides a critique of the California Art Preserva-
tion Act of 1979, the first major legislation in the United States on
moral rights for artists. Discussion centers upon the restrictions
on protection, e.g., restrictions on the types of eligible art and art-
ists, potential defendants, duration of moral rights, and remedies.
Attention is devoted to the relationship of this legislation to other
art-related laws in the United States and elsewhere, and particu-
lar reference is made to relevant sections of the Copyright Revi-
sion Act of 1976.
INTRODUCTION
An all-encompassing aesthetic environment' is now part of ur-
* Adjunct Professor of Law, University of San Diego School of Law; Member,
State Bar of California. M.S. (Law & Society), University of Denver College of
Law, 1976; J.D., University of California Hastings College of the Law, 1974; B.A.,
University of California at Berkeley, 1971.
1. Notwithstanding Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954) and its progeny,
which have sustained "aesthetic" zoning in the interest of pleasing and beautiful
surroundings, by aesthetic one does not necessarily refer to that which is beautiful
or pleasing. See Uddo, Land Use Controls: Aesthetics, Past and Future, 21 LoY. L.
REv. 851 (1951). The urban environment, in any case, is not always attractive or
pleasing. Instead, aesthetic refers to that which has artistic qualities or that which
relates to perception by the senses, at least insofar as the perception is an artistic
one. As -one writer said, "[A)esthetic theory is the theory not of beauty but of
art." R. COLLNGWOOD, THE PRinCip LES OF ART 41 (1958); see also Karlen, What is
Art? A Sketchfor a Legal Definition, 94 LAw Q. REv. 383, 396 (1978). However, in
considering the validity of a design patent, one court said:
The third requirement for a valid design patent is that it must be orna-
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ban society. This environment is composed of the products of the
art and entertainment industries which include art reproductions,
objets d'art, motion pictures, and broadcast programs. It also
consists of the surrounding architecture; music and Muzak;2 ad-
vertising art in the form of neon and graphics;3 the design compo-
nents of mass-produced commodities which are developed to
appeal to the eye of the consumer 4 or to express the commercial
identity of the producer,5 and all of the shapes, sounds, colors,
and even tastes and smells which permeate the experiences of
millions of people.6 What is not apparent is the concomitant de-
velopment of property rights which affect this aesthetic realm. In
fact, the aesthetic environment is laced with legally recognized
property relations. Not only are aesthetic products subject to the
wealth of laws which determine interests in real property and
tangible personal property, but they are also affected by intellec-
tual property rights which are separable from the other property
rights.
Almost all man-made objects are actually or potentially subject
to intellectual property laws. That is, the man-made objects in
anyone's surroundings are potentially affected by copyright,
trademark, unfair competition, and patent laws. Even an object
with minimal artistic form and content,7 if it is a work of author-
ship 8fixed9 in a tangible medium of expression,o may be pro-
mental. Whether a design is ornamental or not depends on whether it ap-
peals to the eyes as a thing of beauty. It must be the product of aesthetic
skill and artistic conception. There is a difference in the meaning of the
terms "artistic" and "aesthetic." The former stresses the point of view of
one who produces art and thinks in terms of creating beauty or form; the
latter stresses the point of view of one who analyzes and reflects upon the
effect of a work of art. Either term may suggest a contrast with the practi-
cal, functional, or moral aspects of something.
Design, Inc. v. Emerson Co., 319 F. Supp. 8, 10 (S.D. Tex. 1970) (citations omitted).
2. See, e.g., Public Util. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952) ("muzak" piped
into streetcars, offending sensibilities of unwilling listeners).
3. See, e.g., Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981) (San
Diego's remedial ordinance, affecting the aesthetic blight caused by billboards,
ruled unconstitutional).
4. See infra note 17 on ornamental designs subject to design patent
protection.
5. See infra notes 12-16 on trademark protection for containers, trade dresses,
and configurations of goods.
6. One cannot doubt after reading J. HuysmANs, AGAINST NATURE (R. Bal-
drick trans. 1959) that the senses of taste and smell as well as those of sight, hear-
ing, and touch are the concern of aesthetic experience. See Quinet, Food as Art
The Problem of Function, 21 BRIT. J. AESTHETICS 159 (1981); Fretter, Is Wine an Art
Object?, 30 J. AESTHETICS & ART CRITICIsM 97 (1971). Contra M. BEARDSLEY, AES-
THETICS: PROBLEMS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF CRITICISM 98-99 (1958) (denying role of
taste and olfactory senses in forming works of art).
7. See 1 M. InIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.01 [B] (1980).
8. Id. § 2.03 [A]. Works of authorship are categorized by the Copyright Revi-
sion Act of 1976 at 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (Supp. 1I 1979).
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tected by copyright laws from the moment of its creation." The
shapes or configurations of goods or the containers in which they
are sold,12 and the trade dresses which serve to distinguish the
goods of one party from those of another,' 1may be protectible
under trademark14 and unfair competition' 5 laws from the
moment they are applied to goods which are circulated in com-
merce.16 Many two-and three-dimensional patterns, configura-
tions and shapes'7 which are applied to mass-produced articles' 8
are eligible for design patent protection. The extraordinary fact,
therefore, is that one is surrounded by a world of objects with
aesthetic content which are potentially subject to hidden residual
rights of other persons. In relative terms, the effect of law on art
is almost as pervasive as the impact of art on society.19
Despite the existence of intellectual property rights in artistic
products, one group of creative persons did not really enjoy all of
the benefits of the laws affecting art. These were the visual artists
such as painters and sculptors.20 Perhaps their failure to benefit
9. Fixed is defined at 17 U.S.C. § 101. See 1 M. NIMER, supra note 7, at
§ 2.03[B].
10. 1 M. NnMMER, supra note 7, at § 2.03[C].
11. Id. §§ 7.16[A] [11 n.3, 9.01[A] [1].
12. See 1 J. GILSON, TRAD mARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE § 2.13 (1980).
13. Id. § 2.12.
14. Id. §§ 2.12,2.13[3].
15. Id. §§ 2.12, 2.13 [4].
16. Id. § 3.02.
17. "A Design [eligible for patent protection] is merely a delineation of form
or figure, either plane or solid-a shape or configuration." Ex Parte Traitel, [1883]
Dec. Comm'r Pat. 92, 25 Off. Gaz. Pat. Office 783 (1883). See also U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF COMMERCE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 1502 (3d ed. 1978) in-
terpreting 35 U.S.C. § 171 (1976). The protectible design must produce "a new and
pleasing impression on the aesthetic sense." RLM. Palmer Co. v. Ludens, Inc., 236
F.2d 496, 500 (3d Cir. 1956). 'The term 'ornamental' (employed at 35 U.S.C. § 171)
as applied to designs relates to something beautiful, something giving a pleasing
appearance, something which appeals to the aesthetic emotions or has artistic
merit." 2 A. DELLER, WALKER ON PATENTS § 160 n.20 (2d ed. 1964).
18. The term articles of manufacture appears at 35 U.S.C. § 171 (1976), al-
though there is no requirement of "mass-production." 2 A. DELLER, supra note 17,
at § 165.
19. Of course, not only do artists and other creators benefit from the property
rights created by law in their intellectual productions, but they also are the direct
and indirect recipients of massive public subsidies under the tax laws (e.g., LR.C.
§ 170(c) (2) (B) permitting deductible charitable contributions to organizations op--
erated exclusively for "literary" purposes) and under the legislation creating the
National Endowment for the Arts (20 U.S.C. § 954 (1976)) and state arts councils.
20. Visual artist has been defined in relation to the following art forms:
"[P]ainting, sculpture, photography, printmaking, video, performance art, concep-
tual art, concrete poetry; or ... any other field requiring visual perception." AR-
fully from the laws of intellectual property was the result of re-
strictions in the laws themselves 21 or practical difficulties of se-
curing their rights.22 Or perhaps the causes were the artists' lack
of bargaining power to assert their rights,23 their reluctance to
permit the law to enter the domain of art, 24 or their ignorance of
the laws in the first place.25 At the same time it was probably the
visual artist who had the greatest need.for legal protections. Un-
like many other types of artists, visual artists, especially "fine"
artists, often work on their own, isolated from cooperative ven-
tures and large-scale productive enterprises. Thus, they have not
formed effective guilds, unions or associations, 26 nor have they in-
stigated well-established trade customs to protect their interests.
However, during the last decade or so visual artists and their
advocates in the legal profession27 began to recognize the need
for specialized legislation to protect visual artists and their
TLAW RESEARCH PROJECT, THE VIsuAL ARTIST AND THE LAw 3 (1977). Cf. Copyright
Office Regulations, 37 C.F.R. § 202.3(b) (ill) (1982) (works registrable under the
classification of visual arts). On the inability of visual artists to benefit fully from
copyright laws in comparison to their literary counterparts, see Hepp, Royalties
from Works of the Fine Arts: Origin of the Concept of Droit de Suite in Copyright
Law, 6 Bui. COPYRIGHT Soc'v U.S.A. 91, 91-93 (1959); Hauser, The French Droit de
Suite: The Problem of Protection for the Underprivileged Artist under the Copy-
right Law, 6 BuLL. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S.A. 94 (1959).
21. See Sheehan, Why Don't Fine Artists Use Statutory Copyright?, 22 Bum,.
COPYRIGHT Soc'y U.S.A. 242, 261-68 (1975) (copyright rules with regard to publica-
tion discriminate against fine artists).
22. See, e.g., Projansky, The Perilous World of Art Law, 4 JuRis DOCTOR 14, 14-
17 (June 1974) which says:
Unorganized, neglected by the state, and seldom able to afford counsel as
a matter of course, artists, unlike almost all other professionals, tend to be
amazingly ignorant of their legal rights .... As clients, many tend to be
stubborn, impractical, and loath to follow advice. Engaged in reshaping a
vision of the world, they are, almost by definition, never satisfied with
what is or what has always been.... A factor affecting almost everything
artists do is the informality of the art world. People who would not imag-
ine buying the tiniest piece of real estate without every legal safeguard,
buy, sell, give, and lend valuable works of art without any documents
whatsoever.
23. Cf., e.g., Price, Government Policy and Economic Security for Artists: The
Case of the Droit de Suite, 77 YALE L.J. 1333, 1356-64 (1968) (bargaining position of
artists to exact royalties from use or sale of their works).
24. See, e.g., Sheehan, supra note 21, at 255-61 on artists' beliefs that copyright
notices deface or demean works of art.
25. See, e.g., id. at 245-55 and J. MERRYMAN & A. ELSEN, LAW ETHICS AND THE
VIsuAL ARTS 4-(85-88) (1979) on artists' ignorance of or misconceptions about
copyright laws.
26. See infra note 116 on artists' organizations. Although most artists may be-
long to some artists' organization (see Sheehan, supra note 21, at 253), only Artists
Equity has made a concerted effort to protect the legal rights of artists, but even
Artists Equity cannot claim the same effectiveness as Actors Equity, the Writers
Guild, or the Screenwriters Guild within their respective areas of concern.
27. See J. MERRYMAN & A. ELSEN, supra note 25, at 5-(317-30) on legal services
for artists and the recent emergence of "Volunteer Lawyers for the Arts"
organizations.
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works.28 Partly as a result of their efforts there is a trend in the
United States concerning rights in artistic creations. Visual art-
ists are now receiving more residual or reserved rights29 in their
works even after parting with ownership. For example, under the
provisions of the Copyright Revision Act of 1976 the copyright is
expressly reserved for the author even though the work may have
been purchased or commissioned by the new owner, unless there
is a written transfer of copyright 30 or acknowledgement that the
work was created "for hire."3 ' California, a major source of inno-
vative legislation on the arts, 32 now recognizes both the droit de
suite (the right to resale royalties) 33 and the droit moral (moral
rights).34 Under California Civil Code section 986 the artist is en-
titled to. a "royalty" of five percent of the gross proceeds derived
from the resale of his work notwithstanding that he no longer
owns the work and that it may be resold several times. Moreover,
according to Civil Code section 987, known as the California Art
Preservation Act, the artist who parts with his work offine art35
can still control the behavior of others which affects the work and
can restrain owners from certain acts which are detrimental to
the work and to the artist's reputation.
The main purpose of this article is to comment on the Califor-
nia Art Preservation Act, which represents one of the boldest de-
velopments in the area of reserved rights for artists. Apart from
offering criticism of this legislation, the purpose is to suggest
some improvements for future legislation on moral rights. An ad-
ditional purpose is to discuss some of the aesthetic and legal is-
28. See Fishman, The Emergence of Art Law, 26 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 481, 484-87
(1977).
29. On "reserved" and "residual" rights see infra note 37. A reserved right in
an artistic work is a right which remains with the author of the work notwith-
standing that the author has parted with the material object in Which the work is
embodied. As expressed by the Copyright Revision Act of 1976, "transfer of own-
ership of any material object, including the copy or phonorecord in which the
work is first fixed, does not of itself convey any rights in the copyrighted work em-
bodied in the object." 17 U.S.C. § 202 (Supp. I 1979). In essence, therefore, the
copyright in the work is a reserved right as far as the author is concerned.
30. 17 U.S.C. § 204 (Supp. I 1979).
31. Id. §§ 101, 201.
32. See infra note 304 for California statutes affecting art.
33. CAL. Cw. CODE § 986 (Deering Supp. 1982); see infra authorities cited at
note 281 on the right to resale royalties.
34. CA. CIrv. CODE § 987 (Deering Supp. 1982); see infra text accompanying
notes 62-68 for enumeration of moral rights.
35. CA_ Civ. CODE § 987(b) (2) (Deering Supp. 1982).
sues involved in drafting legislation relating to moral rights
because moral rights cannot be viewed in isolation but are related
to other areas of law, such as copyright, trademark, unfair compe-
tition, and privacy laws, which equally affect art, entertainment,
and communications. It is beyond the scope of this article to dis-
cuss the theory and history of moral rights and their enforcement
via other legal doctrines because these questions have been in-
vestigated elsewhere. 36
THE CONCEPT OF RESIDUAL RIGHTS
The concept of residual or reserved rights is not new to the
world of art and entertainment. For many years contracts in the
entertainment industry have included provisions for "residuals"
so that actors and other contributors can continue to reap benefits
from further use of their works.37 Copyright, of course, is a spe-
cies of reserved rights which has existed under the common law
for centuries and by statute since 1709 in Britain38 and 1790 in the
United States.39 Nevertheless, entertainment industry residuals
had to be enforced by contract, and copyright laws in the United
States were usually interpreted so that the author was divested of
copyright ownership when the work was purchased or commis-
sioned unless the intent to retain copyright was made evident.40
What distinguishes the new Copyright Act and the California leg-
islation is that they manifest an intention to preserve residual
rights for authors 41 by granting the rights in statutory form and
by making these rights more difficult to alienate.42
36. See, e.g., B. HOLLANDER, THE INTERNATiONAL LAW OF ART 71-98 (1959); Roe-
der, The Doctrine of Moral Right: A Study in the Law of Artists, Authors and Cre-
ators, 53 HARv. L. REV. 554, 555-56 (1940).
37. See SuBSmiARY RIGHiTS AND RESIDUALS (J. Taubman ed. 1968); Gilbert,
"Residual Rights" Established by Collective Bargaining in Television and Radio,
23 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 102 (1958).
38. An Act for the Encouragement of Learning by Vesting the Copies of
printed Books in the Authors or Purchasers of such Copies during the Times
therein mentioned, 1709, 8 Anne, ch. 19.
39. See A. WElL, AMERICAN COPYRIGHT Law 17-18 (1917) (discussing Act of 31
May 1790).
40. See, e.g., Grandma Moses Properties, Inc. v. This Week Magazine, 117 F.
Supp. 348 (S.D.N.Y. 1953); Pushman v. New York Graphic Soc'y, Inc., 287 N.Y. 302,
39 N.E.2d 249 (1942); and other cases cited in 3 M. NnnmErn, supra note 7, at
§ 10.09[B] n.16.
41. Author here refers to the creator or originator regardless of the type of ar-
tistic work involved, and not, in copyright parlance, to either the creator or, if the
work is made "for hire," his employer. See 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 7, at § 1.06
discussing 17 U.S.C. § 201 on the copyright definition of author.
42. See supra text accompanying notes 30-31 (alienation of copyrights); CAL.
CIV. CODE § 986(a) (Deering Supp. 1982) (right to resale royalties not transfera-
ble); CAL. CrV. CODE § 1738.8 (Deering Supp. 1982) (protections granted to artists
under legislation regulating artist-dealer regulations may not be waived).
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Many individuals in the art world and entertainment industry,
especially art collectors, dealers, and those who commissioned ar-
tistic works, have been disconcerted by the new laws, as shown
by the determined challenge to the California statute on resale
royalties.43 To these individuals it seems anomalous that the indi-
vidual who has acquired "ownership" of an artistic or literary
work can be restricted with regard to what can be done with the
work. To them ownership connotes fee simple title in the work,
the type of ownership which one associates with real property. Of
course, what these owners forget is that in today's world property,
including real estate, is-961dom owned "outright." The word prop-
erty, derived from the Latin adjective proprius, meaning "one's
own,"44 at most refers to the legal relations between the owner
and all other persons concerning the use and enjoyment of a tan-
gible thing.45 Although ownership in a pre-industrial society may
have connoted discrete "bundles" of exclusive rights,46 in the
post-industrial age of greatly expanded productive forces and in-
tricate relations of production, the web of legal relationships de-
noting one's property rights in a thing is tangled by statutory and
administrative rules and regulations.47
In light of the numerous intrusions upon exclusive property
rights, such as restrictions on use, alteration, or disposal, it should
not be surprising that artists are granted residual rights which
43. See Morseburg v. Balyon, 201 U.S.P.Q. 518 (C.D. Cal. 1978), affd, 621 F.2d
972 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 399 (1980) (constitutionality of CAL. Crv.
CODE § 986 upheld).
44. E. DRONE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN INTELLECTUAL PRODUC-
TIONS IN GREAT BRIAIN AND THE UNTED STATES 6 (1879).
45. Cf. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 739 (1964) ("A man who has
property has certain legal rights with respect to an item of wealth; property repre-
sents a relationship between wealth and its 'owner"'); R. BROWN, THE LAW OF
PERSONAL PROPERTY § 1.5 (3d ed. 1975) ("property means not the thing itself, but
the rights which inhere in it").
46. See R. BROWN, THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY § 1.5 (3d ed. 1975) (owner-
ship connotes collection or bundle of rights).
47. The full use of one's property, especially real property, is restricted by the
rights of others and often confined to that which does not offend the sensibilities
of others. Today it is difficult to convert one's house for use as a bawdy house or
a funeral parlour. See W. PROssER, HANDBOOx OF THE LAW OF TORTS 592 nn.28-29
(4th ed. 1971). Nor can one burn down one's own house. See R. PERKINS, PERKINS
ON CRImNAL LAw 228 (2d ed. 1969). Indeed, one cannot necessarily build a house
in a certain fashion or let it deteriorate. See generally Noel, Unaesthetic Sights as
Nuisances, 25 CORNELL L.Q. 1 (1939). Even to hang one's clothes on a clothesline
in order to create an eyesore may subject the owner to prosecution. See People v.
Stover, 12 N.Y.2d 462, 191 N.E.2d 272 (1963), appeal dismissed, 375 U.S. 42 (1963).
qualify the rights of owners of artistic works. These new property
rights,48 or choses in action,49 were developed to protect the liveli-
hoods of those who could not otherwise secure their interests
within an economy characterized by rapid communications, com-
plex commercial transactions, and business enterprises of na-
tional and even international scale.5 0 Artists are individuals who
must have new property rights in their works. As any artist can
attest, in the art world with its network of galleries and special-
ized channels for disposition of works of art,5 ' the artist must be
entitled to certain rights in order to survive as a professional. For
instance, the artist must be able to require credit for his work in
order to establish a reputation. Conversely, he must be able to
disassociate himself from work which is not his including his
work which has been so badly altered that it no longer expresses
his creative efforts. Further, to mount exhibitions, especially ret-
rospective ones, he should have access to works he has created
earlier in his career. To do so, he must be able to locate the own-
ers of the works and to prevent destruction of the works. To ef-
fectuate the right to restrain destruction, the artist should have
the right to repair damaged works or to conserve decaying works
so that careless abandonment does not put the work of art be-
yond redemption. In addition, to preserve his economic rights in
the work including copyright and the droit de suite, the artist
must have these rights to maintain the physical integrity of the
work.52
Many of these "moral" rights were previously protected by
utilizing diverse legal theories. However, not until the early part
of the twentieth century was the comprehensive concept of the
droit moral fully developed. 53 The droit moral has its origins pri-
48. E.g., the droit moral and the droit de suite.
49. See 1 R. POWELL, PowELL ON REAL PROPERTY % 13 (1977) on the develop-
ment of "new" property rights. Cf. Reich, supra note 45 ("new" property rights in
governmental largesse, i.e., franchises, licenses and monopolies).
50. See, e.g., Estate of Rothko, 84 Misc. 2d 830, 379 N.Y.S.2d 923 (Surr. Ct. 1975),
modified, 56 A.D.2d 499, 392 N.Y.S.2d 870 (1977), modified, 43 N.Y.2d 305, 372 N.E.2d
291, 401 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1977), the denouement of the saga of Mark Rothko, an artist
beleaguered by the demands of international dealers, charitable foundations, ac-
countants, and attorneys and whose estate was subject to the ravages of interna-
tional art theft, incompetent executors, and quarrelsome heirs. For a more
thorough overview, see Harrow, The Final Word in the ROTHKO Case: Salient Le-
gal Holdings of the Court of Appeals, 4 ART & THE LAw 33 (1978).
51. E.g., juried competitions and shows, auctions, state fairs, and donations to
museums.
52. Cf. the Projansky-Sieglaub contract for the original transfer of a work of
art in L. DuBoFF, T E DESKBOOK OF ART LAw 1131-33 (1977) (reserved and
residual rights of artists protected in model contract used for original transfer of
work of art).
53. On the development of the droit moral, see Roeder, supra note 36, at 555-
56. For a survey of pioneering efforts of French jurists, see Sarraute, Current The-
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marily in two sweeping changes which became evident in the
nineteenth century. One of these changes was economic. The
artist could no longer rely on aristocratic patronage or church
commissions but became subject to the whims of middle class
tastes. No longer was the commissioned work the primary source
of income for artists. Instead, works were thrust out upon the
open market just like any other commodities and were subject to
the vicissitudes of the free market economy in aesthetic cre-
ations.5 4 As an enterpreneur of sorts, the artist became depen-
dent upon his public reputation in order to develop a clientele.
This reputation was easily damaged if the artist was deprived of
credit or associated with a work which was not his, or if his works
were altered so that they did not represent his artistic personal-
ity. After all, the artist was never again to be the creature of sa-
lons and court chambers but was a businessman who had to
guard his name and reputation in the same manner that a
merchant has to prevent the tarnishment, dilution, or infringe-
ment of his trademark.55
The other change which gave rise to the droit moral was a mat-
ter of aesthetics. With the flowering of romanticism in the nine-
teenth century the artist's right to "follow the call of his feelings
and individual disposition" was emphasized as never before.5 6
The work of art was no longer severely restricted by patrons in
terms of subject matter, form and content. Rather, it became the
personal expression of the artist, revealing his individual percep-
tions and sensibilities.5 7 Thus, false attribution of the work and
interference with the integrity of the work by mutilation, altera-
tion, or presentation out of context, were increasingly construed
as personal attacks on the artist. The public, also imbued with ro-
mantic notions about art, was sympathetic regarding moral rights,
and vociferous artists and their allies were able to persuade the
ory on the Moral Right of Authors and Artists under French Law, 16 Am. J. Cou'.
L. 465 (1968).
54. See 11 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WORLD ART 119-32 (1966), on the history of art
patronage.
55. Tarnishment refers to the use of the mark by another in connection with
goods or services which are either inferior in quality or which, in relation to the
trademark owner's products, raise unsavory associations. 1 J. GILSON, supra note
12, at § 5.05 [2]. Dilution refers to the use of the mark by others in connection with
non-competing products in such a fashion that the strength, effectiveness, and dis-
tinctiveness of the mark deteriorates. Id. § 5.05[91.
56. 3 A. HAUSER, THE SOCIAL HISTORY OF ART 166 (1951).
57. Id. at 35, 178-79.
courts to recognize new residual rights in artists' works which
went beyond the scope of copyright protection.5 8
However, although moral rights have been recognized abroad,
for example, under the Berne Convention,5 9 generally speaking
these rights were not developed in the United States except to the
extent that they were enforceable under traditional doctrines of
the law of copyright, libel, unfair competition, and invasion of pri-
vacy.60 The California Art Preservation Act, therefore, represents
a new approach for the United States and may set an example for
other jurisdictions which have not adopted the full spectrum of
moral rights in statutory form.
THE CALIFORNIA ART PRESERVATION ACT
The term moral rights as applied to art is derived from the
French droit moral, but its intended meaning is more aptly ex-
pressed by the German term UrheberpersonlichkeitsreCht6l which
means "right of the author's personality." Moral rights may be
classified into three basic categories:62
(1) The rights to create and to control disclosure and publication of artis-
tic works, 6 3 and the rights to withhold or withdraw them from
58. Concerning the development of the droit moral by French and German ju-
rists during the nineteenth century, see S. STRoMHOLM, LE Daorr MORAL DE
L'AurEuR 115-380 (1966), cited in Marvin, The Author's Status in the United King-
dom and France: Common Law and the Moral Right Doctrine, 20 Ir'L & ComP.
L.Q. 675, 676 n.6 (1971). As indicated by Sarraute, supra note 53, at 466, the droit
moral evolved in France from case law and was not codified until 1957.
59. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, art. 6
bis, 331 U.N.T.S. 217. The Berne Convention is a major international treaty which
establishes international protection for copyrights and moral rights of authors and
other creators.
60. See, e.g., Diamond, Legal Protection for the "Moral Rights" of Authors and
Other Creators, 68 TRADEMARK REP. 244, 259-77 (1978); Marvin, The Author's Status
in the United Kingdom and France: Common Law and the Moral Right Doctrine,
20 INT'L & CoMip. L.Q. 675 (1971); Stevenson, Moral Right and the Common Law: A
Proposal, 6 ASCAP COPYiGIT L. SYmp. 89 (1955); Treece, American Law Ana-
logues of the Author's "Moral Right," 16 AM. J. COMP. L, 487 (1968); Comment, To-
ward Artistic Integrity: Implementing Moral Right Through Extension of Existing
American Legal Doctrines, 60 GEO. LJ. 1539 (1972); Note, The Doctrine of Droit
Moral: Its Place in American Copyright Law, 16 How. .J. 539 (1971); REPORT OF
THE COMMITrEE TO CONSIDER THE LAw ON COPYRIGHTS AND DESIGNS, Cmd. No.
6732, at 16-18 (1977) [hereinafter cited as WHrrFORD COMMITTEE REPORT].
61. 1 S. LADAS, THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIc
PROPERTY 575 n.2 (1938).
62. There are alternative ways of classifying moral rights. See, e.g., Devlin,
Moral Right in the United States, 35 CONN. BAR J. 509 (1961) (five classes of rights:
paternity, integrity, disclosure, withdrawal, and protection from excessive criti-
cism); Sarraute, supra note 53, at 467 (four classes: paternity, integrity, with-
drawal, disclosure).
63. See Diamond, supra note 60, at 252-53; Roeder, supra note 36, at 558-61;
Eden c. Whistler (Cour d'appel Paris, 1900), discussed in B. HOLLANDER, supra
note 24, at 83-84, 306-13.
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publication;64
(2) The rights of authorship or paternity rights, including the right to be
acknowledged as the author of a work under one's own name or a
pseudonym;65 the rights to limited protection of anonymity and pro-
tection against false attribution;6 6 and the right to object to excessive
criticism and attacks on the author's professional reputation;6 7 and
(3) The rights of integrity, including the rights to object to the destruc-
tion of one's work and to prevent its mutilation, distortion, or
alteration.6
8
On August 1, 1979, California once again took the lead in art law
in the United States when the Governor of the State approved the
California Art Preservation Act which became section 987 of the
Civil Code.69 The Act protects the artist's moral rights as "re-
served" rights.70 The preamble, appearing in subdivision (a),
clearly states the purposes of the legislation:
The legislature hereby finds and declares that the physical alteration or
destruction of fine art, which is an expression of the artist's personality, is
detrimental to the artist's reputation, and artists, therefore, have an inter-
est in protecting their works of fine art against such alteration or destruc-
tion; and that there is also a public interest in preserving the integrity of
cultural and artistic creations.
The Act is relatively consistent with its preamble as far as cov-
erage is concerned. The California Legislature, perhaps because
it did not want to trespass on areas covered by other legislation,
particularly federal copyright legislation, provided only for the
rights of integrity and paternity. Conceivably, it was believed that
the new federal copyright legislation preempted state laws on the
64. See Diamond, supra note 60, at 253-54; Sarraute, supra note 53, at 476. Cf.
17 U.S.C. §§ 203, 304 (Supp. 1I 1979) (Copyright Act provisions for termination of
grants); Anatole France c. Lemerre (Civ. Trib. Seine, 1911), cited in L. DuBoFF,
supra note 52, at 800 (rescission of publication contract 25 years after delivery of
work).
65. See Roeder, supra note 36, at 561-65.
66. See Diamond, supra note 60, at 254-55; Lord Byron v. Johnston, 35 Eng.
Rep. 851 (1816); cf. Merryman, The Refrigerator of Bernard Buffet, 27 HASTINGS LJ.
1023, 1027 n.14 (1976) (on the right to disclaim authorship). The protection of ano-
nymity is not absolute. The artist may not remain anonymous under all circum-
stances but should be entitled not to have a work associated with her name if the
work does not represent her creative efforts or artistic personality.
67. See Roeder, supra note 36, at 572-74.
68. See id. at 565-72; cf. L. DuBoFF, supra note 52, at 799-802 (on associated
rights to proper presentation of work as affected by the right to control
disclosure).
69. This was added by ch. 668, § 1, 1979 Cal. Stats. 1501, and authored by State
Senator Sieroty as S. 668. Full text set forth infra in appendix.
70. According to CAs. S.B. 668, § 1, as amended in Senate, May 31, 1979, the leg-
islation was deemed "[a]n act to add Section 987 to the Civil Code, relating to re-
served rights in fine art."
other types of moral rights71 or that other laws covered these
rights in such a way that further legislation would be superfluous.
Even within the two broad classes of moral rights which are cov-
ered,72 the scope of protection conferred by the Act is restricted.
Paternity Rights under the Act
The rights to paternity set forth at subdivision (d) of the Act
are succinctly expressed as follows:
The artist shall retain at all times the right to claim authorship, or, for just
and valid reason, to disclaim authorship of his or her work of fine art.
By granting such rights the Legislature was satisfying an impor-
tant need of artists. Anyone involved with the law of literary and
intellectual property can affirm that paternity rights are often of
equal or greater importance than copyright.T3 For example, the
writer of a first-time best seller depends on being named as the
author to acquire publishing contracts, fame, and fringe commer-
cial benefits. The same probably holds true for authors of visual
works who are protected by the new statute and who depend on
name recognition for future commissions. Not only do paternity
rights have an economic importance for artists74 but also an over-
riding emotional importance. After all, the right to credit at least
can secure the public recognition which so many artists seek.
Before the new statute, artists were not given paternity rights.
If the artist neglected to reserve the right to remain anonymous
or the right to receive credit under his own name or under a pseu-
donym, the purchaser or licensee could display the work without
the proper credit75 or could indicate the artist's true name or a
pseudonym despite the wishes of the artist to the contrary.76
71. See 17 U.S.C. § 301 (Supp. 1I 1979) on preemption; notes 106-07 infra.
72. Because only limited rights of integrity and paternity are provided by the
Act, the disclosure and withdrawal rights will not be discussed.
73. Cf. ILR. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 68, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5659; Copyright Act, 1956, 4 & 5 Eliz. 2, ch. 74, § 9(2) discussed in
WHrrORD COMIITrEE REPORT, supra note 60, at 223 (credit for another author con-
sidered in granting "fair use" defense to copyright infringement).
74. Cf. Paramount Prods., Inc. v. Smith, 91 F.2d 863 (9th Cir. 1937) (damages
awarded for failure to grant screen credit to author of book upon which film was
based); cases cited by 3 M. NImaE, supra note 7, at § 14.02 n.24.
75. See Granz v. Harris, 198 F.2d 585 (2d Cir. 1952); Vargas v. Esquire, 164 F.2d
522 (7th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 813 (1948); Lake v. Universal Pictures Co.,
95 F. Supp. 768 (S.D. Cal. 1950); Clemens v. Press Publishing Co., 67 Misc. 183, 122
N.Y.S. 206 (Sup. Ct. 1910); Ellis v. Hurst, 66 Misc. 235, 121 N.Y.S. 438 (Sup. Ct. 1910);
cases cited by 2 M. Nnman, supra note 7, at § 8.21[E] nn.54, 59.
76. See Gee v. CBS, Inc., 471 F. Supp. 600 (E.D. Pa. 1979); Clemens v. Belford,
Clark & Co., 14 F. 728 (C.C.N.D. Il. 1883); Shostakovich v. Twentieth Century-Fox
Film Corp., 196 Misc. 67, 80 N.Y.S.2d 575 (Sup. Ct. 1948), affid, 275 A.D. 692, 87
N.Y.S.2d 430 (1949); cases cited by 2 M. Nn R, supra note 7, at § 8.21[D] [1] nn.35,
37.
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Such rights could only be protected by employing other legal doc-
trines. For instance, anonymity could be preserved by arguing
the right to privacy 7 7 or, if the work were wrongly credited to the
artist, by claiming false attribution and in appropriate cases suing
for defamation.7 8 The right to receive credit under one's own
name could be protected under thleories of implied contract.79
Where there was actual false attribution with the use of another's
name, the common law tort of injurious falsehood could be as-
serted by the true author.80 Even tort theories of unfair competi-
tion could be used in appropriate cases if the credit line were
distorted so that the public was confused as to the true origin of
the work.81
The Act obviates some of these legal maneuvers for fine artists,
but its coverage of paternity rights is quite scanty. In the first
place, the legislation does not grant moral rights of the same
breadth as those recognized abroad. The right to use a pen name
is not expressed in the Act, nor is there an explicit remedy for
passing off.8 2 In addition, the right to disclaim authorship is
preconditioned upon 'Just and valid reason," thus seemingly
shifting the burden of proof to the artist to show that anonymity
77. See, e.g., Neyland v. Home Pattern Co., 65 F.2d 363 (2d Cir. 1933); cases
cited by 2 VL Nnm R, supra note 7, at § 8.21[D] [1] nn.38-40. Cf. Shostakovich v.
Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 196 Misc. 67, 80 N.Y.S.2d 575 (Sup. Ct. 1948),
af fd, 275 A.D. 692, 87 N.Y.S.2d 430 (1949) (privacy claim under § 51 of the New
York Civil Rights Law denied), Ellis v. Hurst, 66 Misc. 235, 121 N.Y.S. 438 (Sup. Ct.
1910) (pseudonymity protected by privacy laws).
78. See Geisel v. Poynter Prods., Inc., 295 F. Supp. 331 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (plain-
tiff Dr. Seuss, argued that substandard dolls manufactured by defendant, based
upon plaintiffs cartoon characters, were falsely attributed to plaintiff and dam-
aged plaintiff's reputation), cited in 2 M. NnudER, supra note 7, at § 8.21[D] [1] n.41.
79. Cf., e.g., Granz v. Harris, 198 F.2d 585 (2d Cir. 1952) (implied term read into
contract to protect against wrongful attribution).
80. To take credit for another's work is equivalent to "slander of title" in rela-
tion to the true author and owner and may interfere with the ability of the true
author to exercise his rights with regard to the work. On this basis an action for
"injurious" or "malicious falsehood" may be established. See PROSSER, supra note
47, at 915-26 on "injurious falsehood."
81. See Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Co., Inc., 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976)
(the Monty Python case) and Geisel v. Poynter Prods., Inc., 295 F. Supp. 331
(S.D.N.Y. 1968) (the Dr. Seuss case) where unfair competition was alleged under
§ 43(a) of the Lanham Trademark Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1976) based upon
"palming off." See also Smith v. Montoro, 648 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1981), an unfair
competition case involving "reverse passing off" (actor's name removed from
credits).
82. "Passing off" consists of attributing one's goods to or associating them with
someone else with the usual object of increased sales. See W. PROSSER, supra
note 47, at 957.
should be permitted. Why the artist should not maintain privacy
through anonymity without justifying such a desire is difficult to
understand. Perhaps the legislators thought that, even against
the artist's wishes, the owner-collector should be able to attribute
the work to a famous artist in order to raise its value. Also, fail-
ure to allow anonymity in all cases may be a boon to archivists
and art historians who must trace the authorship and prove-
nance83 of works of art. Auctioneers, too, are more enamored by a
name than by artistry. Nevertheless, these reasons certainly can-
not outweigh the artist's right to create controversial works under
the cover of anonymity so that he will not prejudice his existing
reputation. Similar arguments could be made in terms of an art-
ist's right to freedom of speech.84 The failure to tolerate anonym-
ity, especially in art, restricts expression having religious,
political, and sexual contents. One way of preserving the right to
remain anonymous would have been to leave it to the market-
place under the clause in the Act which permits artists to waive
their rights.85 In this fashion owner-collectors who wished to as-
sure the value of the work could insist on waiver of the right to
anonymity at the time of purchase.
Potentially the most serious fault, which may be dispelled as a
matter of statutory interpretation, is that the phrase "the right to
claim authorship"86 has no bite to it. Anyone can claim author-
ship, and the artist could have done so before the Act. To claim
authorship all he had to do was to hire communications equip-
ment for use on the street corner. No one could stop him, assum-
ing that the claim was justified. What the drafters probably
intended but did not express is that "the artist shall have the
right to claim and receive proper credit for his work of fine art." A
similar clause would apply to disclaimer. Thus, in order to give
the artist the full and enforceable group of paternity rights, subdi-
vision (d) should have read in part:
The artist at all times shall retain the right to disclaim authorship, and
83. Provenance in art is the history or record of ownership of a work. See, e.g.,
Mathias v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 50 T.C. 994, 999 (1968), where provenance
was an issue in relation to the valuation of a work.
84. Cf. Talley v. California, 363 U.S. 60 (1960) (affirming the right to distribute
anonymous handbills contrary to local ordinance).
85. CArL. Crv. CODE § 987(g) (3) (Deering Supp. 1982).
86. Phrase derived from art. 6 bisof the Berne Convention, supra note 59. The
Netherlands Copyright Act, art. 25, cited and recommended by the WErFORD CoM-
LFTrEE REPORT, supra note 60, at 17-18, is more to the point.
(a) The right to object to publication of the work under a name other
than his own, as well as any alteration of the name of the work or the indi-
cation of the author, if such name or indication appears on or in the work
or has been made public in conjunction with the work.
[VoL. 19: 675, 1982] Moral Rights
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
shall retain the right to claim and receive proper credit under his own
name or under a reasonable pseudonym of his choosing.
The pseudonym must be reasonable in order to prevent artists
from insisting upon ridiculous or inappropriate pseudonyms
which reduce the value of the work to the owner-collector and
perhaps to insulate the owner from liability for displaying the
work with an improper pseudonym.8 7 For the sake of clarity it
could be added that "proper credit shall be determined in relation
to the medium of expression and the nature and extent of the art-
ist's contribution to the work."88 This latter phrase would help to
settle disputes about top billing and under billing;89 an inconspic-
uous credit, after all, is almost equivalent to no credit. Few au-
thors wish to be known only posthumously by archivists; most
want contemporary recognition by a live public.
The disclaimer clause, which does not contain a direct refer-
ence to false attribution and does not permit anonymity in all
cases, could be further amended to read:
The artist shall have the right to disclaim authorship and to restrain false
attribution of works wrongfully credited to him.
This latter phrase would provide a remedy for passing off where
the named artist is not the true author of the work. No further
provision need be inserted for malicious or injurious falsehood
because the right to receive credit provided elsewhere probably
subsumes the right to restrain others from taking credit. Of
course, this wording would still offer no remedy for the artist who
merely wishes to restrain another person from taking credit with-
out claiming it for himself.
The other moral rights which are classed along with paternity
87. There is some need to restrict what may be used as a pseudonym. For in-
stance, suppose the artist uses a pseudonym in connection with an artistic work
and the pseudonym is confusingly similar to the name of another artist. The own-
er of the work or a licensee, who must associate the work with the pseudonym,
could be subjected to liability for unfair competition. See supra note 82 on "pass-
ing off," a form of unfair competition.
88. Analogous rights are recognized in the motion picture industry in which
the nature and form of screen credits are prescribed by collective bargaining
agreements. See, e.g., 1 J. TAUBmAN, PERFORMMnG AnTs MANAGEiENT AND LAWV 220
n.5 (1972) (screenwriters' credits). Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 401(c) (Supp. I 1979) and ac-
companying regulations (placement of copyright notices dependent upon type of
work).
89. By top billing one means the most conspicuous credit, while under billing
connotes an insufficient credit which is not commensurate with the contribution to
the work. See, e.g., Harris v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 43 F. Supp. 119
(SD.N.Y. 1942) (co-author of screenplay only given credit for "story research").
rights, such as the rights to be free from excessive criticism and
attacks on the artist's reputation, are not covered by the Act.
Hence, these rights are not discussed here. Presumably the legis-
lators had the impression that the artist's remedies for defama-
tion and disparagement were sufficient.9 0
The Rights to Integrity
The rights to integrity are the principal concern of the Act, but
not all are covered, and the chosen ones are limited in scope. Ba-
sically the Act offers remedies to artists for the "physical deface-
ment, mutilation, alteration, or destruction" of their works of "fine
art."9' The rights are essentially negative in nature and do not
encompass their positive counterparts such as the rights to con-
serve, restore, or repair works which have been damaged. Of
course, even these latter rights are not usually included within
the panoply of moral rights abroad.9 2 One reason for their ab-
sence is to avoid the conflict between these rights and the inter-
ests of landowners to whom the artist may be a trespasser should
he enter the owner's property to minister to his works.93 None-
theless, the rights to conserve, restore, and repair can be very im-
portant with respect to works of visual art, especially works which
are subject to rapid deterioration. The decision to omit these af-
firmative rights and to concern the Act primarily with intentional
vandalism may permit destruction of art because the purchaser or
licensee can allow the work to decay with impunity unless he has
already given his covenant not to do so. 94
The important advantage of the Act is that it recognizes the
90. The principal case on disparagement and defamation is Whistler v. Ruskin,
discussed in B. HOLLANDER, THE INTENATONAL LAw OF AnT 197-200 (1959). See
Annot., 64 A.L.R.2d 245 (1959); Outcault v. N.Y. Herald Co., 117 A.D. 534, 102 N.Y.S.
685 (1907); Battersby v. Collier, 34 AD. 347, 54 N.Y.S. 363 (1898).
91. CAL. CMv. CODE § 987(c) (Deering Supp. 1982).
92. There appear to be no cases or statutes which provide for affirmative rights
to repair or restore a work of art. However, subd. (c) (1) of the Act, supra note 34,
(which prohibits intentional destruction or damage) when coupled with subd.
(e) (1) (which provides injunctive relief as a remedy) and subd. (e) (5) (which per-
mits the court to order "any other relief which the court deems proper") may per-
mit the court to order that the plaintiff be allowed to repair or restore a damaged
work. Such an order need not be construed as a mandatory injunction. The de-
fendant is merely enjoined from interfering with restoration or repair by the
plaintiff.
93. Even the artist as copyright proprietor has no right to enter the premises
of the "owner" of the work because copyright law clearly distinguishes ownership
of the tangible object from ownership of the reserved rights. See 17 U.S.C. § 202
(Supp. III 1979). This means that the artist as copyright owner may have no guar-
antee that he may make physical copies of the original copy of the work.
94. The word commission employed at subdivisions (c) (1), (2) of section 987
along with other words such as mutilation seem to exclude guilt by "omission."
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right to restrain destruction. In many other jurisdictions this
right does not exist because of the notion that destruction does
not have an adverse effect on the artist's reputation.95 The Cali-
fornia legislators, however, have correctly perceived that destruc-
tion does have a harmful effect on the artist's reputation in
certain cases. 96 For instance, where the artist's work is destroyed
amid publicity that it is obscene, immoral, or poorly rendered, the
artist's reputation may suffer.9 7 Another reason for the ban on de-
struction is that the legislation is concerned not only with the art-
ist's reputation but also ostensibly with the "public interest in
preserving the integrity of cultural and artistic creations." 98
In their concern with the most direct types of damage to the
artist's work, however, the drafters neglected to cover rights
which relate to the use of the work. Certain unconscionable uses,
in substance, can amount to alteration or mutilation. These latter
rights include the rights to have the work presented in the proper
context and in its full form and content. The right to full presen-
tation implies that the work be displayed in its entirety should ex-
hibition of the separate parts detract from the impact of the work
as a whole.9 9 Additionally, full form and content means that the
title bequeathed by the artist should be exhibited and associated
with the work because the title, as an integral part of the work,
often conveys the artist's intentions or the meaning of the
work. 00 The right to full presentation also involves the concomi-
tant right to retain the structural and organizational integrity of
95. See Merryman, supra note 66, at 1023, 1034-35; Roeder, supra note 36, at
569; Crimi v. Rutgers Presbyterian Church, 194 Misc. 570, 89 N.Y.S.2d 813 (Sup. Ct.
1949) (church mural destroyed without artist's consent and moral rights denied);
Lacasse et Welcome c. Abbe Quenard (Cour d'appel Paris, 1934), cited in L.
DuBoFF, supra note 52, at 805 (artist denied relief when work destroyed by Abbe).
But see Judgment of April 3, 1936, Counseil d'etat, 1936 Dalloz, Jurisprudence [D.
Jur.] I 56 (relief granted when broken statue used to fill holes in the road).
96. See generally Perkins, Literary Property-Artist's Right to Prevent Destruc-
tion of His Work After Sale, 1951 WASH. U.L.Q. 124.
97. See, e.g., Crimi v. Rutgers Presbyterian Church, 190 Misc. 570, 89 N.Y.S.2d
813 (Sup. Ct. 1949) (portrayal of Savior unseemly; mural destroyed); Judgment of
April 3, 1936, Conseil d'etat, 1936 D. Jur. 1I 56 (statue abused by birds and boys
destroyed, and pieces of statue used to fill holes in the road).
98. CAL. Civ. CODE § 987(a) (Deering Supp. 1982).
99. See supra the case of Bernard Buffet discussed in Merryman, note 66. Buf-
fet painted six panels on a refrigerator and found that, much to his chagrin, a
panel was about to be sold separately as an individual work. He brought an action
in the French courts to prevent the separate sale of the panel, and won.
100. On deformation of title, see De Bekker v. Stokes, 168 A.D. 452, 153 N.Y.S.
1066 (1915), afd, 219 N.Y. 573, 114 N.E. 1064 (1915).
the work. Thus, even if the work is shown in its totality, there will
be no excuse to distort the arrangement, shape, or balance of the
work in a way which thwarts the artist's intentions.1O' Mainte-
nance of proper context is just as important as full presentation
and perhaps could have been covered by the Act were there not
the problem of preemption by the Copyright Act.102 The serious
artist who finds his work duplicated on the face of a matchboxlO3
or otherwise juxtaposed with crude commercial material or mate-
rial alien to his beliefs' 0 4 is in the same position as one whose
work has been physically mutilated. In such cases there is cer-
tainly a need to protect the expression of the artist's personality
and the artist's reputation.0 5
The legislature did not involve itself with distortions not result-
ing from physical alterations seemingly because of the potential
conflict with the new federal copyright laws.10 6 Section 301 of the
Copyright Revision Act of 1976 explicitly calls for preemption of
all state laws which concern matters falling within the purview of
federal copyright laws. 0 7 Once the artist divests himself of copy-
right the new copyright owner may have the exclusive rights to
reproduce, distribute, and display the work and to prepare deriva-
tive works based on it.108 To prevent the new owner from
presenting the work out of context or from presenting only part of
101. Rearrangement of the work is a problem often encountered with television
and motion pictures. See, e.g., Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Co., Inc., 538 F.2d
14 (2d Cir. 1976) (Monty Python); Stevens v. National Broadcasting Co., 148
U.S.P.Q. 755 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1966) (preliminary injunction), 150 U.S.P.Q. 572 (Cal.
Super. Ct. 1966) (trial for contempt of court) ("A Place in the Sun"); Preminger v.
Columbia Pictures Corp., 148 U.S.P.Q. 398 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1966), aff'd, 149 U.S.P.Q.
872 (App. Div. N.Y. 1966), affid, 150 U.S.P.Q. 829 (Ct. App. N.Y. 1966) ("Anatomy of
a Murder").
102. See 2 M. NnmEnR, supra note 7, at § 8.21 [C] [2] on preemption.
103. See Scherr v. Universal Match Corp., 297 F. Supp. 107 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), affid,
417 F.2d 497 (2d Cir. 1969) (copyright case where plaintiffs discovered their work
duplicated on matchbook covers).
104. See Shostakovich v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 196 Misc. 67, 80
N.Y.S.2d 575 (Sup. Ct. 1948), affid, 275 AD. 692, 87 N.Y.S.2d 430 (1949) (music of
Soviet composers used in anti-communist film; action partially based upon moral
rights denied); Soc. Chant de Monde c. Soc. Fox Europe et Soc. Fox American
Twentieth Century, 1954 D. Jur. 16, 80 (Cour d'appel, Paris) (same case, opposite
result).
105. CAL. Crv. CODE § 987(a) (Deering Supp. 1982).
106. See 2 M. NMMER, supra note 7, at § 8.21[C] [2].
107. 17 U.S.C. § 301 (Supp. MI 1979) causes preemption of all state laws which
cover rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights granted to copyright
owners under § 106 of the Copyright Act as such rights affect works which come
within the scope of works of authorship covered by §§ 102, 103 of the Copyright
Act. The effect of preemption is to bar all state law causes of action which fall
within the ambit of the subject matter and exclusive rights covered by the new
Copyright Act.
108. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (Supp. I 1979).
IvoL 19: 675, 1982] Moral Rights
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
the work would impinge on his rights as a copyright proprietor. 0 9
Although partial presentation and presentation out of context
may be redressed under the law of defamation or even under the
law of unfair competition,nO more rigorous protection is needed,
and this is one additional reason for the coordination of copyright
laws with other laws on the arts.
To the extent that the moral rights imposed by the Act affect
the rights of expression of others there may also be a conflict with
first amendment right to free speech. Thus, the artist's rights to
challenge certain presentations of his work based upon the droit
moral could be denied. For example, if the artist's work dis-
played out of context were used to make a political statement, the
rights of the user may prevail over those of the artist."' In fact,
an argument could be made that even certain physical alterations
could not be restrained if they, too, were made to express political
or religious convictions.
Restrictions on Coverage
Apart from the incomplete grant of the rights of integrity and
paternity, the Act is restricted to certain types of artistic works
created under certain conditions. The aesthetic problems arise
because the statute applies only to the "wrork of fine art," meaning
"an original painting, sculpture, or drawing of recognized quality"
but excluding the work "prepared under contract for commercial
use by its purchaser."" 2 Moral rights as recognized abroad are
not confined to these works of 'Te art" but apply as well to liter-
ary and other types of artistic works.113 Probably the drafters of
the Act felt that they were already taking a sufficiently large step
by enacting controversial legislation to aid the embattled visual
artist and to complement the resale royalties statute" 4 which was
109. See supra note 102.
110. Cf. cases cited supra notes 38 & 41 on paternity rights. See Diamond,
supra note 60, at 264-65 (citing Donaldson v. Wright, 7 App. D.C. 45 (1895));
Chesler v. Avon Book Div., 76 Misc. 2d 1048, 352 N.Y.S.2d 552 (Sup. Ct. 1973).
111. Cf. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1967), reh'g denied, 393 U.S. 900
(1968) (an important case involving draft card burning and the balancing of gov-
ernmental interests and individual rights to free expression through conduct
rather than through "verbal speech").
112. CAT. CIV. CODE § 987(b) (2) (Deering Supp. 1982).
113. E.g., under the Berne Convention, supra note 59, art. 2.
114. CAL. Crv. CODE § 986 (Deering Supp. 1982).
already under attack.115 Moreover, the visual artist has the great-
est need for moral rights. He not only lacks the protection of
strong guildsll6 and of well-established trade customs"17 which
prohibit the mutilation of his creations, but also, as the creator of
unique originals, he is more vulnerable to losing a work forever.
In addition, a broader statute affecting other forms of art would
have created problems with drafting because of the special con-
siderations for different types of artistic vorks. For instance, the
specialized coverage for those who frame, conserve, and restore
works of art1 8 would not apply to non-visual artistic works such
as music or poetry, nor would the provisions on buildings 1 9 apply
to non-visual works.' 20 However, there was nothing to bar the leg-
islature from protecting works of artistic craftsmanship as per
section 101 of the new Copyright Act. 21 Clearly, the legislators
showed concern only for works embodying art in its highest form,
usually represented by unique non-utilitarian works the destruc-
tion of which would be a great loss to the cultural heritage of the
State.
Nevertheless, if the drafters intended to protect only unique
115. See supra note 43.
116. The two nascent trade organizations, V.AG.A (Visual Artists and Gal-
leries Association, with a New York central office) and S.PA.D.E.M. (Societe de la
Propriete Artistique et des Dessins et Modeles, with a central office in Paris), are
not powerful or well-known, at least in comparison, for example, to A.S.C.A.P.
(American Society of Composers, Authors, and Performers) and B.1.I. (Broadcast
Music, Inc.). Nor is Artists Equity able to prescribe trade customs and payment
schedules as can Actors Equity. For a complete list of artists' organizations see T.
CRAwFoRD, LEGAL GUIDE FOR THE VISUAL ARTIST 213-16 (1977).
117. Unlike writers and entertainers, visual artists have not had the experience
of negotiating collective bargaining agreements.. Nor are there trade practices, for
example, permitting visual artists to register their works as can screenwriters with
the Screenwriters' Guild. However, a Code of Fair Practice for artists, dealers, and
collectors was drafted by the Joint Committee of the Society of Illustrators, Art
Directors Club, and Artists Guild. L. DuBoFF, supra note 52, at 1136-37. This terse
Code and other similar efforts at making rules for the visual arts are not widely
used primers for artists, dealers or collectors.
118. CAL. CIrV. CODE § 987(c)(2) (Deering Supp. 1982); of. CAL. CIV. CODE
§§ 1738-1738.9 (Deering Supp. 1982) on the special treatment of dealers. These sec-
tions of the Civil Code create a unique relationship between artists and those who
sell the artists' works of fine art on consignment.
119. CAL. CrV. CODE § 987(h) (Deering Supp. 1982).
120. Disagreements among the numerous arts groups also would have
presented grave difficulties as evidenced by the intervention and conflict among
various interest groups representing the different arts in the revision of the copy-
right laws. See M.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5659 (House report on the new copyright revision
legislation) for the effect of special interest groups.
121. See George Hensher Ltd. v. Restawile Upholstery (Lancs.) Ltd., 1976 A.C.
64, for a full discussion of the term "work of artistic craftsmanship" according to
the Copyright Act, 1956, 4 & 5 Eliz. 2, ch. 74, § 3(1); cf. Cuisenaire v. South West
Imports Ltd., 1968 Can. Exch. 493; Cuisenaire v. Reed, 1963 Vict. 719 (cases on
"works of artistic craftsmanship").
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works of art they may have failed. The requirements that the
works befine art and original do not preclude protection of multi-
ple "originals." Concededlyfine art may exist in copies. For ex-
ample, few would deny that Rembrandt etchings or Rodin
sculptures, created in multiples, are products of fine art.-22 The
requirement that the works be original also does not limit the
number of protectible copies because in a legal sense original
only denotes work derived from the creative efforts of the artist
and not born of plagiarism. 23 Copyright law, for instance, which
is only concerned with original works of authorship,12 4 is not lim-
ited to the protection of the mythical template from which all cop-
ies were made but makes provision for multiple originals.12 If
original has a similar meaning within the context of the Califor-
nia Act, then the legislation may protect multiple originals such
as limited edition prints.
Of course, it has been argued that original, as used at section
986 of the Civil Code on resale royalties, does not apply to multi-
ples.126 However, the issues are not so clear in the case of art
preservation. Moral rights, or at least the rights of integrity,
should apply to original works produced in a very limited quanti-
ty in the same way that exemptions from customs duties apply to
unbound, hand-produced prints12 7 and to ten or fewer sculptural
122. See Karlen, supra note 1, at 392-93, on the "art" status of copies; cf. Cahn,
What is an Original Print?, 37 N.Y. ST. BAR J. 546 (1965), on the status of multiple
fine prints.
123. See 1 M. NnisR, supra note 7, at § 2.01 [A] n.12, and cases cited therein,
including Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1970);
Wihtol v. Wells, 231 F.2d 550 (7th Cir. 1956); Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts,
191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951); accord University of London Press v. University Tutorial
Press [1961] 2 Ch. 601; Byrne v. Statist Co. [1914] 1 IKB. 622; Graves Case, 4 L.R.-
Q.B. 715 (1869).
124. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (Supp. 1I 1979).
125. Cf. id. § 101 (Copyright Act definition of "copies" which includes the origi-
nal copies from which others were made). On the depreciation of copies see
Hoagland, Originality and Aesthetic Value, 16 BIrT. J. AEsTHETcs 46 (1976).
126. See M. PRICE & H. SANDIsON, A GUIDE TO THE CAIFORIA RESALE ROYAL-
TIES ACT 19 (1976). The resale royalties legislation, CAL. CIV. CODE § 986, was en-
acted to provide some measure of royalties to the creator of unique originals,
perhaps under the French theory of taxing consumption of the work through time.
It was not enacted as another "copyright" statute to provide compensation based
upon the sale of multiples. See also Price, Government Policy and Economic Se-
curity for Artists: The Case of the Droit de Suite, 77 YALE LJ. 1333, 1340-41 (1968);
2 M. NnamRE, supra note 7, at § 8.22[A] [1].
127. 19 U.S.C. § 1202, sched. 7, pt. II, item 765.10 (1976); of. Karlen, supra note 1,
at 392-93 nn.71-72 on U.K customs laws.
castings. 128 For instance, if there are only three extant copies of a
work, it should not be argued by the owner of one copy that he
should be immune from the operation of the statute merely be-
cause, if he destroys his copy, there will still be two left. The
other two already may have been destroyed or altered either acci-
dentally or intentionally, thus leaving no copies of the work. At
the other extreme, however, there is no urgent need for the pres-
ervation of mass-produced works. The artist who silkscreens hun-
dreds or thousands of copies should not ask for protection under
the Act, assuming that a silkscreen product is otherwise protected
as a painting.129 The Act should have taken the approach of the
customs cases and statutes which restricted the number of multi-
ples protected, or limited protection to those multiples executed
by the artist or under his direct supervision.130 On the other
hand, these types of restrictions need not be applied to paternity
rights because the rights to credit or anonymity should not de-
pend on the number of copies made.131
A more severe problem concerns the requirement of recognized
quality132 which represents a substantial departure from most
laws on art. Recognized quality refers to that which "artists, art
dealers, collectors of fine art, curators of art museums, and other
persons involved with the creation or marketing of fine art" say
has recognized quality. 33 In a sense this represents an elitist
view of art which lets the art world judge its own creations while
128. 19 U.S.C. § 1202, sched. 7, pt. 11, item 765.15 (1976).
129. See infra note 149 on customs definitions for paintings.
130. See B. Altman & Co. v. United States, 224 U.S. 583 (1912); William S. Pit-
cairn Corp. v. United States, 39 C.C.P.A. 15 (1951); United States v. Roth, 22
C.C.P.A. 293 (1934); F.L. Kraemer & Co. v. United States, 34 Cust. Ct. 19 (1955);
Gregory v. United States, 32 Cust. Ct. 228 (1954); Thannhauser v. United States, 14
Cust. Ct. 62 (1945) (cases concerning the role of the artist in actually making or
supervising the creation of replicas).
131. CAL. Crv. CODE § 3344 (Deering 1972), which forbids the use of another's
name for advertising purposes or for soliciting purchases and which may repre-
sent a form of "paternity" rights, does not depend for its application on the
number of copies made.
132. The only comparable requirement of real importance emanates from the
landmark obscenity case of Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, reh'g denied, 414 U.S.
881 (1973), in which Chief Justice Burger exempted works of "serious literary or
artistic value" from the purview of obscenity laws. The impact of this ruling is to
compel judges and juries to decide whether the work has "serious" value in light
of contemporary developments in the arts. The intentions of the artist must
surely be a factor in such a decision. Accord, Obscene Publications Act, 1959, 7 & 8
Eliz. 2, ch. 66, § 4(1) (works serving the "public good" in the "interests of art").
See 1 M. NinMER, supra note 7, at § 2.01 [B] concerning minimal quality require-
ments for purposes of copyright protection.
133. CAL. Crv. CODE § 987(f) (Deering Supp. 1982); cf. Obscene Publications
Act, 1959, 7 & 8 Eliz. 2, ch. 66, § 4(2) (experts can testify regarding literary or artis-
tic merit to establish or negate "public good" defense to obscenity prosecution).
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the man on the street looks on with awe of disbelief.13 4 Of course,
it could be argued that the art world is more tolerant toward new
art forms and means of expression, thus, in effect, broadening the
protection enjoyed by artists. But why quality in the first place,
and what is quality? Does quality connote a certain quantum of
craftsmanship?135 A de minimis standard for artistic form and
content?136 A work which falls into comprehensible categories of
art forms and media and which can be understood by others?137
Or, in terms of being recognized, that it is the work of an estab-
lished artist or that the work has been given recognition by being
part of a museum or gallery exhibition?13 8 All of these questions
134. This institutionalized closed shop has been advocated in G. DicKIE, ART
AND THE "AESTHETIC: AN INsTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS (1974). See McGregor, Dickie's
Institutionalized Aesthetic, 17 BrT. J. AESTHETICS 3 (1977). On.the whole, the elit-
ist approach has been rejected by the courts and commentators. As Lord Reid
said in George Hensher Ltd. v. Restawile Upholstery (Lancs.) Ltd., 1976 A.C. 64, 78
with regard to what is artistic:
If any substantial portion of the public genuinely admires and values a
thing for its appearance and gets pleasure or satisfaction, whether emo-
tional or intellectual, from looking at it, I would accept that it is artistic
although many others may think it meaningless or common or vulgar.
See infra text accompanying note 140.
135. Craftsmanship probably should not be required. Nevertheless, in George
Hensher Ltd. v. Restawile Upholstery (Lancs.) Ltd., 1976 AC. 64, the Lords did dis-
cuss the craftsmanship embodied in the original work which plaintiff claimed was
a "work of artistic craftsmanship" for purposes of copyright protection. There is
no similar American case requiring craftsmanship for copyright protection.
136. The new Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (Supp. 1I 1979), which mentions
"works of authorship," impliedly imposes a minimal standard for creativity. See 1
M. Nn=nE, supra note 7, at § 2.01 [B].
137. The Copyright Revision Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (Supp. I 1979),
surely does not limit protection to the enumerated categories of works because
such categories are merely illustrative and not definitive. See 1 M. NnmiER, supra
note 7, at § 2.03[A]. The customs statutes, however, were limited in terms of ex-
empting established and recognizable art forms. See infra notes 148-51 and accom-
panying text.
138. Cf., e.g., LR.S. Publication No. 561, Valuation of Donated Property, which
indicates that the exhibitions at which the particular art object has been displayed
may be considered in determining fair market value. One difficulty with "recog-
nized" is that the interpreter of the Act cannot be sure whether the plaintiff must
prove that the quality of the work has already been "recognized," e.g., by inclusion
in a gallery show or other public exhibition, or that the work a priori is a "quality"
work recognized for its merits by the experts who testify at trial If prior recogni-
tion is required then the plaintiff may rely primarily on provenance and past re-
views, shows, and exhibitions. The better the reviews and the more prestigious
the shows, exhibitions, and prior owners, the stronger the case for the plaintiff. If
the plaintiff must rest her case on proving "recognition" by the experts at trial,
then she should select well-known experts as her witnesses. Most likely, the ag-
grieved artist will be permitted to rely upon both past and present recognition of
the quality of work. Nevertheless, subdivisions (a) and (f) of the Act support the
will beset the courts which first hear cases under the Act.139 Be-
cause the courts have been loathe to become arbiters of taste, the
judges in these cases will probably abstain from treading on the
uncertain ground of aesthetic judgment, and the oft-quoted
maxim of Justice Holmes will be cited on many occasions:
It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to
constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations,
outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits. At one extreme, some
works of genius would be sure to miss appreciation. Their very novelty
would make them repulsive until the public had learned the new language
in which their author spoke. It may be more than doubted, for instance,
whether the etchings of Goya or the paintings of Manet would have been
sure of protection if seen for the first time. At the other end, copyright [or
moral rights] would be denied to pictures which appealed to a public less
educated than the judge. Yet if they command the interest of the public,
they have a commercial value--and the taste of any public is not to be
treated with contempt. It is an ultimate fact for the moment, whatever
may be our hopes for a change. 140
Although the quality requirement may have been included to
effectuate the purpose of saving valuable works for posterity, it
does not achieve this purpose. History shows that one generation
should not judge for posterity because, even though most great
artists are recognized during their lifetimes, many others are ac-
claimed only posthumously, often long after their deaths. After
all, Mozart was once eclipsed by Salieri, and the Impressionists in
France were scorned by the academicians.
The most serious difficulty with recognized quality is that it
may bar enforcement of the statute in the first place. The legisla-
tors may have forgotten to consider all of the ramifications when
they used the term. What happens when a unique work has been
destroyed and the artist has no available photographs or other
tangible evidence concerning its quality or appearance? Is there
any way to prove recognized quality where the owner has de-
stroyed the work and only the artist can testify for the plaintiff
about its appearance? This is a serious practical problem because
few artists keep complete photographic records of their works.141
Of course, even if photographs are kept there may be no way to
discern recognized quality from the prints or transparencies. The
only virtue of recognized quality is that for the first time art crit-
interpretation which calls for evidence of recognition by the experts who testify at
trial. To require only past recognition would restrict protection to works created
by well-established artists.
139. As of the date of this writing no appellate cases have construed the provi-
sions of the Act.
140. Bleistein v. Donaldson Litho. Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903); accord Walter v.
Lane, 1900 A.C. 539.
141. Even if the artist keeps photographic records, how is 'recognized quality"
substantiated? Is the best evidence rule applied? See, e.g., CAL Evm. CODE
§§ 1500-1511 (Deering 1966 & Supp. 1982) (California's best evidence rules).
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ics and journals on aesthetics will not be the only sources of pub-
lished aesthetic judgments; judges and juries will also have their
say. Instead of ruminating on the lives and works of famous art-
ists, the critic or philosopher can now turn his attention to impor-
tant names in "art" litigation such as Donaldson Lithographing
Company, 42 Restawile Upholstery,43 Mazer,14 4 and Ladbroke
(Football) Limited145 in order to learn about what is happening
in the area of art criticism.
In addition to the problem of recognized quality there are ques-
tions concerning the restricted application of the Act to fine art,
which is defined in terms of "paintings," "sculptures," and "draw-
ings."'4 6 This parsimonious definition stands in contrast to the
more liberal definitions elsewhere in the Civil Code. For instance,
section 982(d) (1) of the Civil Code, dealing with reproduction
rights, defines fine art as:
any work of visual art, including but not limited to, a drawing, painting,
sculpture, mosaic, or photograph, a work of calligraphy, a work of graphic
art (including an etching, lithograph, offset print, silk screen, or work of
graphic art of like nature), crafts (including crafts in clay, textile, fiber,
wood, metal, plastic, and like materials), or mixed media (including a col-
lage, assemblage, or any combination of the foregoing art media).147
In fact, because terms such as mosaic and collage appear sepa-
rately from drawing, painting, and sculpture at section 982(d) (1),
the Act may be strictly interpreted. For instance, painting may
only denote pictorial works employing paint. The choice of only
three types of works, i.e., paintings, sculptures, and drawings,
does not simplify matters very much because, with the emergence
of multimedia works and new media of expression, 4 8 there are
142. Bleistein v. Donaldson Litho. Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903) (copyright protection
for illustrations).
143. George Hensher Ltd. v. Restawile Upholstery (Lancs.) Ltd., 1976 A.C. 64
(copyright protection for furniture designs).
144. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954) (copyright protection for statuettes in-
corporated in lamp bases).
145. Ladbroke (Football) Ltd. v. William Hill (Football) Ltd. [1964] 1 W..R. 273
(H.L.) (copyright protection for betting coupons).
146. CA. CIV. CODE § 987(b) (2) (Deering Supp. 1982). CA. CIV. CODE § 986
(Deering Supp. 1982) is also restricted to these three types of artistic works.
147. Somehow porcelain painters have extended the scope of what is fine art
for all statutes including the Act by persuading the legislature to enact CAT. CIv.
CODE § 997 (Deering Supp. 1982) which reads: "In this state, for any purpose, por-
celain painting shall be considered a fine art and not a craft."
148. Customs cases on the various art forms are collected in Derenberg &
Baum, Congress Rehabilitates Modern Art, 34 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1228 (1959).
still difficulties in delineating what are paintings,149 sculptures,150
and drawings.151 Perhaps, therefore, the legislators should have
considered protection for all "pictorial, graphic and sculptural"
works which are the concern of copyright, 5 2 subject to the other
limitations in the Act including the limitation that the works be
fine art. The legislators were interested in saving valuable works
of art and wanted to avoid litigation concerning anything with ar-
tistic content. However, the cost and time expended in calling ex-
pert witnesses to testify about quality may 6utweigh the interests
in limiting protection.153
The solution to the problem offine art lies not with quality but
with the quantum of artistic labor employed in creating the work
and the use to which the work is put. Moreover, the termfine art
cannot be defined merely in relation to certain types of works
such as paintings, sculptures, and drawings. At most, fine art is a
term having as much sociological as aesthetic significance and
owes its origin to the concept of beaux artes which came into
vogue at the end of the eighteenth century with reference to the
arts which attained beauty in its highest form or appealed di-
rectly to the aesthetic emotions. 54 As such, philosophers, and
even case law, have included music, drama, poetry, painting,
sculpture, and architecture in the category of fine arts.155 Thus,
the definitions in the customs cases, which delimitfine arts in re-
lation to the nature and purpose of the works, are correct. 56
149. See, e.g., the customs cases on status as "paintings," United States v.
Perry, 146 U.S. 71 (1892) (stained glass); Tiffany v. United States, 66 F. 736
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1895) (painted silk and bone fans); Brantman v. United States, 54
Cust. Ct. 444 (1965) (illustrated map).
150. See, e.g., the customs cases on status as "sculptures," United States v.
Olivotti & Co., 7 Ct. Cust. App. 46 (1916) (non-representational sculpture); Stern v.
United States, 3 Ct. Cust. App. 124 (1912) (ornamental sculptures); Brancusi v.
United States, 54 Treas. Dec. 428 (Cust. Ct. 1928) (non-representational sculpture).
151. See, e.g., Vonnegut & Bohn v. United States, T.D. 25104, GA. 5609 (1904),
affd sub nom. Young v. Bohn, 141 F. 471 (C.C.D. Ind. 1905) (architect's drawing a
work of art for customs purposes) (plaintiff Vonnegut was probably Kurt Von-
negut's architect father).
152. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102(a) (Supp. 1I 1979).
153. With regard to evidence concerning the "art" status of a work, see Karlen,
supra note 1, at 399-400.
154. See R. COLLINGWOOD, PRINCIPLES OF ARRT 6 (1958).
155. See, e.g., G. HEGEL, Introduction to the Philosophy of Art, in HEGEL SELaC-
7oINs 311-37 (J. Loewenberg trans. 1929); 6A C.J.S. Art § 291 nn.29 & 30 (1975)
(painting, drawing, architecture, sculpture, as well as music, dancing and dramatic
arts); United States v. Perry, 146 U.S. 71 (1892) (painting and sculpture as fine art);'
O'Sullivan v. English Folk Dance & Song Soc'y [1955] 2 All E.R. 845 (CA.) (folk
dancing and music not fine art); Nonentities Soc'y v. Linley & Kidderminster B.C.,
47 R. & IT. 426 (1954) (drama as fine art); Royal College of Music v. Westminster
Vestry [1898] 1 Q.B. 809 (music as fine art).
156. See Derenberg & Baum, supra note 148, for collected customs cases.
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A work of fine art stands in contrast to an ornament157 or a
work of craft'5 8 because it functions purely as art and not merely
as decoration or embellishment or as an object of utility. Further-
more, fine art need not be confined to any particular media of ex-
pression. 59 What usually characterizes fine art is the non-
utilitarian purpose and the high degree of artistic labor expended
in its creation. Almost all man-made goods are potentially the
product of three types of labor, both mental and physical: the la-
bor of the scientist or engineer, the labor of the craftsman or
workman, and the labor of the artist or aesthetic designer. The
scientific or engineering labor, often largely mental, gives the
product its utilitarian characteristic so that the product functions,
has stability, and serves its intended purpose. The labor of the
craftsman or workman, largely physical, is employed to give the
product its physical form and content and its "workmanship." Fi-
nally, the labor of the artist or aesthetic designer is used to make
the product appeal to the eye of the beholder160 or to have the
work express the personality of the creator.16' Each of these
types of labor may be present in varying degrees, and products
may embody the full spectrum of each type. 62 For example, cer-
tain works of "fine art," especially contemporary art, embody little
157. See Karlen, supra note 1, at 403 n.25, 404 nn.26-27.
158. See id. at 402 nn.21-22, 403 nn.23-24.
159. See id. at 401-04.
160. Cf. supra note 17 on design patents. The United Kingdom statute on de-
sign patents reads:
In this Act the expression "design" means features of shape, configura-
tion, battern or ornament applied to an article by any industrial process or
means, being features which in the finished article appeal to and are judg-
ed solely by the eye, but does not include a method or principle of con-
struction or features of shape or configuration which are dictated solely by
the function which the article to be made in that shape or configuration
has to perform.
Registered Designs Act, 1949, 12, 13 & 14 Geo. 6, ch. 88, § 1(3) (emphasis added).
161. CAL. CrV. CODE § 987(a) (Deering Supp. 1982) (fine art as "expression of
the artist's personality").
162. For notes on craft, art, and the division of labor, see Osborne, The Aesthetic
Concept of Craftsmanship, 17 BrT. J. AESTHETICS 138 (1977) ("designer," "work-
man," and "engineer"); Fethe, Craft and Art: A Phenomenological Distinction, 17
BRIT. J. AESTHETICS 129 (1977); Martland, Art and Craft: The Distinction, 14 Barr.
J. AESTHETICS 231 (1974); Dufrenne, The Aesthetic Object and the Technical Object,
23 J. AESTHETICS & ART CrTIcISM 113 (1964). As Plato said in Politicus, quoted in
Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer, 414 F. Supp. 939, 941 (D.D.C. 1976): "All the handicrafts
possess a scientific content which has grown up along with them and is embodied
in their practice. The manufactured article is the joint product of the science and
the practice [technique] which are combined in the handicraft."
or no craftsmanship or scientific labor, whereas most mass-pro-
duced articles incorporate significant investments of each type of
labor to give the product its full value to the consumer.
Although fine art is characterized by the high degree of artistic
labor employed in comparison to the other types of labor ex-
pended on its production, all useful works which may be feats of
craft or engineering skill should not be excepted from the cate-
gory of fine art. To do so "would exclude the Ghiberti doors of
Florence, or the fountains of Paris or Versailles.' 63 The work of
fine art, however, appeals primarily to the aesthetic senses even
though it can serve a utilitarian or ornamental purpose, and its at-
traction as art, as the image of the world around it or as the per-
sonal expression of its creator, overshadows its other functions. 64
Therefore, any "pictorial, graphic or sculptural"165 work embody-
ing a very substantial quantum of artistic labor, or designed to ap-
peal to the aesthetic senses but not merely as ornament nor as
only incorporated in a useful article,166 should qualify for protec-
tion under the Act. The standard of recognized quality should be
discarded and the experts sent back to their curatorial activities.
The copyright definition for "pictorial, graphic, and sculptural
works" is purely a matter for the judge to decide, and there is re-
course to copyright case law.167 Furthermore, the quantum of ar-
tistic labor and the purpose of the work, as well as the intent of
the creator,168 could be determined by the judge or jury directly
from observation of the work or from the testimony of the
parties.169
163. Morris Eur. & Am. Express Co. v. United States, 85 F. 964, 966 (C.C.S.D.N.Y.
1898); accord Almy v. Jones, 17 R.L 265, 21 A. 616 (1891) ("fine art" described as
"art whose aim is beauty rather than utility, though not necessarily to the exclu-
sion of utility, when the two can be combined").
164. See R. ARNHM, ART AND VISUAL PERCEPTION 135 (1966).
165. Terms defined by the Copyright Revision Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp.
m 1979).
166. Cf. id. (copyright protection for designs of useful articles insofar as they
incorporate "pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can be identified sepa-
rately from, and are capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects of
the article").
167. See 1 M. NMMER, supra note 7, at § 2.08 on definition of "pictorial, graphic,
and sculptural" works.
168. On the intent of the artist, see opinions of the Lords in George Hensher
Ltd. v. Restawile Upholstery (Lancs.) Ltd., 1976 A.C. 64; e.g., Lord Reid, id. at 78;
Lord Morris, id. at 81; Lord Simon, id. at 95; Lord Kilbrandon, id. at 96.
169. See Karlen, supra note 1, at 398-99, 407, on proof of art-related matters. If
experts are called, their opinions with regard to quality must be based upon facts.
As the court said in Hahn v. Duveen, 133 lisc. 871, 877-78, 234 N.Y.S. 185, 191-92
(Sup. Ct. 1929), one of the most celebrated art cases, involving a clash of world fa-
mous art experts:
I have profound respect for critics whose conclusions rest upon facts.
What they say should be carefully considered by a jury. The opinions of
any other kinds of experts are as "sounding brass and tinkling cymbals."
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The commercial use restriction17 0 is even more baffling than the
other qualifications. Consider the possibilities. Suppose the pur-
chaser commissions a painting for use in reproductions. Does
this mean that the work can be destroyed with impunity?' 7 ' If a
sculpture is commissioned for installation in a storefront or other
business premises, may there be carte blanche destruction?1 7 2
The commercial exclusion operates against the modem trend to
grant similar protections to works used incidentally in commerce
and works created solely for contemplation by aesthetes. This
trend began with the deletion of the "fine arts" clause of the
Copyright Act of 1870173 and continued with the incorporation of
the clause on "works of artistic craftsmanship" in the 1948 Copy-
right Office Regulations'7 4 and the inclusion of this clause in the
Copyright Revision Act of 1976.175 The opinion of the United
States Supreme Court in Mazer v. Stein 7 6 demonstrated that
there is no reason, as far as copyright is concerned, to distinguish
between museum pieces and works embodied in commercial arti-
cles. 7 7 The same conclusion reached by the Court in Mazer
On the objectivity of aesthetic and economic value of works of art, see Sagoff, On
the Aesthetic and Economic Value of Art, 21 Barr. J. AEsTHETrcs 318 (1981); Wei-
land, Quality in Art, 21 BRIT. J. AESTHETICS 330 (1981); Best, The Objectivity of Ar-
tistic Appreciation, 20 BRrr. J. AESTHETICS 115 (1980).
170. CAL. Crv. CODE § 987(b) (2) (Deering Supp. 1982).
171. Cf., e.g., United States v. J.E. Bernard & Co., 33 C.C.PA. 166 (1946); Pitt &
Scott v. United States, 18 C.C.P-.A 326 (1931); Progressive Fine Arts Co. v. United
States, 18 C.C.P. 306 (1930); Whitman Publishing Co. v. United States, 6 Cust. Ct.
465 (1941); American Colortype Co. v. United States, 2 Cust. Ct. 132 (1939) (cus-
toms cases on works used commercially in reproductions).
172. Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (Supp. I 1979) (standard of "commercial" use em-
ployed by the Copyright Act to limit the doctrine of "fair use"); see 3 M. NnsmR,
supra note 7, at § 13.05[A] [1] (commercial and nonprofit uses in reration to "fair
use"); cf. 17 U.S.C. § 506(a) (Supp. HI 1979) (criminal prosecutions arising from
wilful infringements for "commercial" advantage).
173. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 211 (1954).
174. 37 C.F.R. § 202.8 (1949) (originally printed in 13 Fed. Reg. 8648, 8650 (1948)).
175. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. I 1979). The parallel development in United King-
dom law with regard to "works of artistic craftsmanship" is outlined by Lord Si-
mon in George Hensher Ltd. v. Restawile Upholstery (Lancs.) Ltd., 1976 A.C. 64,
89-91.
176. 347 U.S. 201 (1954). -The Court held that statuettes incorporated in bases
for table lamps were protectible under the Copyright Act of 1909.
177. See also George Hensher Ltd. v. Restawile Upholstery (Lancs.) Ltd., 1976
A.C. 64, in accord with Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954), in holding that copyright
protection may overlap with design patent protection (in the United Kingdom,
"registered designs").
should apply to the Act.178 If the legislators wanted to provide ex-
emptions for those who procure commercial works, they should
have done so by making certain changes in the waiver clause, as
discussed below. 79 The lawmakers may have believed that works
madefor hire'80 to be used commercially, e.g., for advertising art,
are not necessarilyfine art because they are used primarily to sell
merchandise and not to "arouse aesthetic satisfaction."' 8 ' Alter-
natively, they may have felt that in the commercial setting the
owner has more of an interest in the work made for hire and that
such works naturally tend to be disposable or susceptible to alter-
ation or damage. 8 2 Further, following the approach which
qualifies first amendment protections for commercial expres-
sion, 8 3 it could be contended that commercial art does not have
the same status as speech or as expression of personality con-
ferred on true works of art. 84
Plaintiffs and Defendants
Once the artist can establish that the work is fine art of recog-
nized quality, not purchased for commercial use, he must show
that he is a proper plaintiff, determine who are proper defendants,
and prove the necessary mens rea 85 for each defendant. If the
artist is "the individual" or one of the "individuals who create a
178. But see customs cases on commercial art cited supra note 171 (courts were
reluctant to grant exemptions from customs duties).
179. CAL. Crv. CODE § 987(g) (3).
180. The term is used in the Copyright Revision Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101,
201(b) (Supp. MI 1979). A "work made for hire," the copyright of which is owned
by the employer or party commissioning the work, is a work (1) created within the
scope of employment, or (2) as a result of a commission or order if (a) the com-
mission agreement is in writing, (b) the agreement states that the work is one
made for hire, and (c) if the work falls into certain categories of artistic works.
181. O'Sullivan v. English Folk Dance & Song Soc'y [1955] 2 All E.R. 845 (C.A.)
(folk dancing and folk singing are not "fine arts" for purposes of rates exemptions
for fine arts organizations).
182. Advertising art, for instance, is ephemeral in terms of content and is usu-
ally expected to be destroyed.
183. See Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981); Bates v.
State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977); Linmark Assoc. v. Township of Wil-
lingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977); Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Con-
sumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
184. See Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952) (motion pictures are
a form of expression protected by the first and fourteenth amendments to the U.S.
Constitution); United States ex reL Radich v. Criminal Court of New York, 385 F.
Supp. 165 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) ("flag" art upheld as protectible speech).
185. Mens rea is the mental state required for criminal liability, and has some-
times been defined as "guilty mind" in the law of crime. R. PERmINs & R. BoYcE,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRmINAL LAw AND PROCEDURE 400 (5th ed. 1977). Be-
cause the equivalent mens rea terms such as "intent," "knowledge,' 'reckless-
ness," and "negligence" are found in the law of torts, the concept of mens rea is
employed here.
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work of fine art"186 he may be eligible to bring an action under the
Act. There should be no obstacle if the artist is the sole author,
unless the defendant asserts that the artist did not create the
work in question. In this regard it could be said that the Act re-
quires a work of authorship as defined by the Copyright !aws.l87
Thus, "readymades,"188 machine-created works, and industrial
and natural jetsam should not qualify, although the artist should
have the protection given to creators if he has a hand in shaping
the work, for example, by programming the machine or mounting
or assembling natural or machine-made objects.1 89
The real complications are posed by joint authorship.190 What
does the artist have to contribute to the work before he qualifies
for the droit moral? Once again copyright laws are relevant. Any
person who makes more than a de minimis contribution to the ar-
tistic form and content of the workl91 should be protected at least
with respect to paternity rights,192 although perhaps not with re-
spect to rights of integrity.193 It may not be feasible to utilize stan-
186. CAL. CiV. CODE § 987(b) (1) (Deering Supp. 1982).
187. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (Supp. 111 1979); 1 M. NnmR, supra note 7, at
§ 2.03[A]. The "work of authorship" is a man-made work embodying minimal
creativity.
188. Marcel Duchamp was the famous progenitor of the 'readymades" which
consisted of objects such as bottle racks and snow shovels that were signed and
displayed as art. See HK JANsON, HISTORY OF ART 529-30 (1962).
189. See Karlen, supra note 1, at 389 (machine-created works).
190. The Copyright Revision Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. 111 1979), reads:
"A joint work' is a work prepared by two or more authors with the intention that
their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a uni-
tary whole." The definition of 'Joint authorship" follows logically. See 1 M. NiM-
mER, supra note 7, at § 6.01.
191. Cf. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1025-1033 (Deering 1971) (ownership of objects which
are created by uniting the materials and workmanship of two or more persons).
192. For most cases involving joint authorship of a copyrightable work the con-
tribution of each joint author must be more than de minimis. 1 M. NmIArEs, supra
note 7, at § 6.07. In some cases involving later reworking of a preexisting work a
more "substantial and significant" contribution may be required for status as a
joint author. Id. at § 6.03. Regardless of which standard is preferred for moral
rights, as a practical matter there is usually some way to grant minor credit to any
contributor either in advertising or display. Cf. Marquet c. Lehmann (Trib. Civ.
Seine, 1923), cited in L. DuBOFF, supra note 52, at 802; Fleg c. Gaumont (Trib. Civ.
Seine, 1922), cited in Strauss, The Moral Right of the Author, 4 Am. J. Coln'. L. 506,
508 n.12 (1955) (cases on the rights of multiple authors to credit). But see Harris v.
Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 43 F. Supp. 119 (S.D.N.Y. 1942) (contributor
denied proper credit despite credit to other contributor). For the French law re-
garding joint authors, see Sarraute, supra note 53, at 478.
193. A minor contribution by a co-author should not necessarily be used to pre-
vent an owner or major contributor from altering the work. Unlike paternity rights
which can easily be granted or withheld without significant harm to the owner or
dards such as substantial contribution even though they are
employed in the law of copyright. 94 Such standards often call for
aesthetic judgments which judges and juries are not equipped to
make. On the other hand, craftsmen, foundry workers, and arti-
sans who merely execute the work according to the explicit in-
structions of the artist, for instance, by pouring molten liquid into
the artist's mould' 95 or by drawing lines on a canvas according to
detailed plans set forth by the artist, 9 6 do not have the same
need for moral rights.197 It is possible, however, to imagine situa-
tions in which their reputations could be damaged by alterations
and false credits. Therefore, at most, only limited paternity rights
should be granted to such persons to enforce their rights to claim
or disclaim credit for certain works. 9 8 Obviously this same ap-
proach should apply to machine-made works; so, for example, the
person who inspires the program for a computer work (if it can
quality asfine art) should be an eligible plaintiff and not the own-
er or operator of the computer, unless their contribution is such
that they merit limited paternity rights for their execution of the
artist's ideas. 99 Finally, it should be no bar to recovery that the
work constitutes a copyright infringement of another work so long
as the artist has contributed some original material, notwithstand-
ing the difficulty of establishing paternity rights.200
minor contributor, often the costs of accommodating the minor contributor with
respect to the rights of integrity are too prohibitive.
194. See 1 M. NImix, supra note 7, at § 6.03.
195. Cf CAT_ CrV. CODE § 1140 (Deering Supp. 1982) (ownership of dies, molds,
or forms; manufacturers of molds, perhaps hired by sculptors, permitted to ac-
quire title to molds and to destroy or dispose of them).
196. Sol LeWitt, for example, is an artist whose works are transcribed, often
thousands of miles away from him, by others who follow written instructions.
197. Cf cases cited supra note 130 on reproductions executed by or under the
direction or supervision of the artist, Karlen, supra note 1, at 400-01 (design-execu-
tion issues). Note the amusing notator-notatee case of Cummins v. Bond, [1927] 1
Ch. 167 (medium entitled to copyright in writing, not dead person who dictated to
medium or party at seance who transcribed automatic writing of medium).
198. Rights analogous to these proposed rights for craftsmen and artisans come
from the law of defamation and unfair competition. See supra notes 78 & 81.
199. Under the law of copyright both the "conceptualist" (one who conceives
the work) and the "executant" (one who executes it) can claim co-ownership in
the copyright, although the ideas contributed may not of themselves be pro-
tectible. See 1 M. NnIMER, supra note 7, at § 6.07. However, in some cases the ex-
ecutant who merely carries out the explicit orders of another may not contribute
enough to the work of authorship to qualify as a joint author.
200. Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 103(b) (Supp. I 1979) which says:
The copyright in a compilation or derivative work extends only to the ma-
terial contributed by the author of such work, as distinguished from the
preexisting material employed in the work, and does not imply any exclu-
sive right in the preexisting work. The copyright in such work is in-
dependent of, and does not affect or enlarge the scope, duration,
ownership, or subsistence of, any copryight protection in the preexisting
material.
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Having qualified himself as an eligible plaintiff the artist must
determine the proper defendants. The California statute seems to
include all persons as potential defendants except the artist who
created the work. Subdivision (c) (1) granting the rights of integ-
rity applies to intentional acts by persons other than the "artist
who owns and possesses a work of fine art which the artist has
created." Once more the problem of joint authorship appears. If
one co-author is in possession of the work which he still owns (at
least partially), the other co-authors have no remedy should he
destroy it contrary to their wishes. This situation is not merely
hypothetical; it happens many times in practice. The exemption
should have been limited to the artist who is the sole owner. As
far as paternity rights are concerned, subdivision (d) should be
construed to permit an artist to sue a co-author for violation of his
rights to claim or disclaim credit.201
Mens Rea
If the Act gives rise to litigation the determination of proper de-
fendants should not pose serious problems, but mens rea will
often be a vexing issue. The Act is primarily designed to provide
remedies for damage to works of art caused by licensees, bailees,
and disgruntled owners, and the reason for requiring intentional
disfigurement by owners and licensees is that they have consider-
able interests in the works of art. Nevertheless, it may have been
wrong to have applied the same standard to both licensees and
owners since the interests of licensees usually do not approach
those of full owners. Furthermore, even though the imposition of
liability on members of the general public has furthered the cause
of art preservation, there is no need to require intentional con-
duct by those who have few, if any, recognized interests in the
work of art.20 2 In fact, if the artist is to retain the integrity of his
201. Cf. Guino c. Consorts, Renoir (Trib. gr. inst. Paris, 1971), cited in L.
DuBOFF, supra note 52, at 802; Marquet c. Lehmann (Trib. Civ. Seine, 1923), cited
in Serraute, supra note 53, at 478 n.30; Fleg c. Gaumont (Trib. Civ. Seine, 1922),
cited in Strauss, supra note 192, at 508 n.12 (French cases afrming rights of multi-
ple authors to credit).
202. Cf. CA. PENAL CODE § 622 (Deering 1971) which provides for criminal
sanctions against those who damage works of art, and, thus, along with other "ma-
licious mischief' statutes deters members of the general public. Note that the
droit moral, as recognized abroad, is for the most part only addressed to owners,
licensees, and others in possession and not to the general public. See I. DESBOLS,
LEDRorr DE L'AUTEUR EN FRANCE 549 (1978).
work, why not impose liability for negligent acts by members of
the general public?203 A negligent act by anyone may result in de-
struction of the work. In turn, the destruction may cause the loss
of copyright and resale royalties because there will be no work to
copy or resell.
There is another problem with intention. It is often difficult to
prove because it represents a "subjective" mens rea.2 0 4 Even
when the owner cracks the work over the head of his or her
spouse during a quarrel it could be argued that the intent was to
injure the spouse and not the work. Most courts, however, would
probably rule that oblique intent2O5 was sufficient for liability in
such a case. Where the owner or licensee has only knowingly or
recklessly caused damage there may be no liability if intention-
ally is strictly construed. For example, the owner who leaves
statuary certain to attract freelance carvers and authors of graffiti
may not be liable, nor will the owner who displays unprotected
charcoal drawings outdoors on a rainy day. At the very minimum,
even owners should be responsible at the level of recklessness for
conscious disregard of the artist's moral rights. 206
Even though owners are not liable for reckless conduct, there is
the standard of gross negligence for framers, "conservers," and re-
storers which points to liability if these persons, while the work is
in their charge, "exercise so slight a degree of care as to justify
the belief that there was an indifference to the particular work of
fine art."207 At first glance, this definition is a classic one for reck-
lessness, that is, the disregard for the consequences of one's con-
duct or failure to act.208 The lesser requirement of gross
negligence may be justified by the fact that framers and restorers
203. Cf. CAL. Crv. CODE § 1714.1(b) (Deering Supp. 1981) under which the con-
duct of minors is imputed to their parents who are liable to pay for "the deface-
ment of property of another with paint or a similar substance."
204. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2) (a) (Proposed Official Draft 1962) (defini-
tion of "purposely"); S. 1, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 302(a) (1975) (definition of "inten-
tional"), cited in Karlen, Men Rea: A New Analysis, 9 U. TOr- L REv. 191, 235
n.166 (1978). "Intention" may be proved "objectively" insofar as there is recourse
to external factors, e.g., motive; however, it is a "subjective" mens rea because
only the defendant's state of mind is at issue unlike cases involving 'recklessness"
and "negligence" where the judge or jury must be cognizant of external circum-
stances under which the defendant's conduct took place.
205. See J. BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MoRALs AND LEG-
isLAToN ch. 8, para. 6 (1780). An actor's conduct reflects "oblique" intent in rela-
tion to the result of the conduct i4 although the result may not be desired, the
actor knows that it is substantially certain to occur. Arguably this is equivalent to
the mens rea "knowledge."
206. Cf, MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2) (c) (Proposed Official Draft 1962) (defini-
tion of "recklessly," which could be applied to the Act).
207. CAL. Cirv. CODE § 987(c) (2) (Deering Supp. 1982).
208. See supra note 206.
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and those in related occupations are professionals who should be
held to a stricter standard.209 In addition, these art-related profes-
sionals cannot claim the same interests in the work as those of
the owner. Prior to this legislation artists had remedies against
those who worked for them to frame, conserve, or restore their
works if such persons culpably damaged the works. Liability at-
tached at the point of negligence as it would in other cases involv-
ing persons hired to repair property.21o However, if the artist
relinquishes ownership the Act now provides remedies against
the art-related professionals who work for other persons, includ-
ing collectors and museums. This is the purpose of the droit
moral, to protect the work regardless of who owns the physical
object. But why should the Act not be extended to negligent con-
duct by the art-related professionals when the artist no longer
owns the work? Why restrict actions for mere negligence to those
brought by the owner? If the artist is to retain residual rights
such as moral rights, copyright, and the right to resale royalties,
enforcement should not depend on whether the artist has parted
with ownership.2 11 One reason for the standard of gross negli-
gence is that it is at least an objective standard. The phrase "to
justify the belief that there was an indifference to the particular
work of fine art" eliminates any requirement for a subjective state
of mind on the part of the defendant.2'2
Despite the attention focused on mens rea and the rights to in-
tegrity, the Act is silent with regard to paternity rights and the de-
fendant's state of mind.213 Certainly the gross negligence
209. See CAL. Civ. CODE § 1738.6(c) (Deering Supp. 1982) under which an art
dealer is strictly liable for damage or loss while the artist's work remains with the
dealer on consignment.
210. Cf. CA. Crv. CODE §§ 1858-58.3 (Deering 1981) (strict liability for theft, fire,
and vandalism of personal property brought to depositary for repair). Ordinarily,
a bailee is only liable for negligence. 9 CAT_ Jun. 3D Bailments § 34 (1974).
211. In this situation the art-related professionals are not oumers in any sense.
Note, if the artist is still the owner of the work, his remedies under the Act are
greater than those of other owners who must sue for conversion and collect dam-
ages under CAL. CIV. CODE § 3336 (Deering 1972).
212. Cf. Karlen, supra note 204, at 223 n.119 and authorities cited therein includ-
ing Se'avey, Negligence-Subjective or Objective?, 41 HAnv. L. REV. 1 (1927) and
Edgerton, Negligence, Inadvertence, and Indifference; the Relation of Mental States
to Negligence, 39 HAav. L. REV. 849 (1926). Although "indifference" denotes a sub-
jective state of mind, i.e., lack of caring or concern, "slight degree of care," as used
in the same subd. (c) (2), is objective since it only relates to the defendant's con-
duct. Further, 'Justify the belief" only refers to the belief of the trier of fact. Ac-
tual "indifference" need never be shown.
213. Subdivision (d) of CAL. CrV. CODE § 987 (Deering Supp. 1982) does not
standard for art-related professionals should not apply to pater-
nity rights, nor should intentional conduct be required for all
other persons. Paternity rights can be analogized to certain rights
stemming from the laws on privacy, defamation, and unfair com-
petition.214 For the same reasons that these laws do not generate
"intentional" torts,215 paternity rights should be violated by con-
duct that is less than intentional. For instance, if by mistake the
artist is wrongfully deprived of credit and another's name substi-
tuted in his place, he should not have to prove intentional miscon-
duct. Negligence alone should suffice, and perhaps even strict
liability should be applicable. The artist may be seriously dam-
aged by false attribution and should be entitled to injunctive re-
lief under the Act even if the defendant's conduct could be
described as "negligent" or "excusable." Undoubtedly, if injunc-
tive relief were permitted where liability was imposed at the level
of negligence or strict liability, the courts would not award puni-
tive damages 216 and would be hesitant to award attorney's fees.217
To mollify the effect of the attorney's fees provision where liabil-
ity for negligent or even non-negligent conduct is imposed, the
statute may be interpreted so that it has the same consequence
as that of section 505 of the Copyright Act. That is, the court
would award attorney's fees to the prevailing party where the vio-
lation has been willful or the action brought in bad faith.218 The
mention the defendant's state of mind. Presumably, because subdivisions (c) (1)
and (2) qualify the artist's rights by requiring intention and gross negligence on
the part of defendants, plaintiff's action under subdivision (d) should not be so
qualified.
214. See supra notes 77-78, 81.
215. Defamation, unfair competition, and invasion of privacy are not intentional
torts. See W. PROSSER, supra note 47, at 772-76 (defamation); id. at 958 (unfair
competition); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967) and Briscoe v. Reader's Digest
Ass'n, 4 Cal. 3d 529, 483 P.2d 34, 93 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1971) (reckless disregard suffices
for invasion of privacy).
216. Punitive damages are permitted under subdivision (e) (3) of the Act. For
the most part, exemplary and punitive damages are only awarded in connection
with torts which involve intention, knowledge, or recklessness. Cf. CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 1745 (Deering 1981) (exemplary damages awarded in cases of knowing failure to
make disclosures in connection with offer or sale of fine prints); CAT_ Cirv. CODE
§ 3294 (Deering 1972) (exemplary damages generally); CAL. Cirv. CODE § 3344
(Deering 1972) (exemplary damages for knowing use of name or likeness in
advertising).
217. Attorney's fees may be awarded under subdivision (e) (4) of the Act. Cali-
fornia courts are reluctant to award attorney's fees even when empowered to do
so. The general rule is that attorney's fees cannot be recovered as costs or dam-
ages in law or in equity unless expressly provided by statute or contracted by the
parties. The amount of attorney's fees awarded is within the discretion of the
court and need not represent what the prevailing party has expended. See 23 CAL.
JuR. 3D Damages § 102 (1975).
218. See 3 M. Nnim1R, supra note 7, at § 14.10fD] on the interpretation of 17
U.S.C. § 505, which provides for awards of attorney's fees to the prevailing parties
in copyright infringement cases.
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statute, therefore, may be flexible enough to permit liability at the
level of negligence or strict liability without imposing harsh
sanctions.2 19
Remedies
Feasibility is the crucial test for the statute. Will artists use
it,220 and will it help to preserve works of art? A look at the reme-
dies offered by the statute should enable any lawyer to gauge
whether it is workable.
At first sight the remedies and the duration of protection seem
quite adequate. The potential relief is broad in scope. The artist
can ask for actual damages, equitable relief, and even punitive
damages. 22 1 However, punitive damages are merely retaliatory
from the artist's point of view because they are not awarded to
the artist but, in the court's discretion, to "an organization or or-
ganizations engaged in charitable or educational activities involv-
ing the fine arts in California."22 2  Most importantly, the artist
may recover attorney's fees and expert witness fees.22 3 Seem-
ingly, the artist has most of the potential remedies afforded under
federal copyright laws to owners who register their claims to
copyright before infringement.224 In fact, the combination of ac-
tual and punitive damages, attorney's and witness fees, and equi-
table relief is required to make art-related statutes effective. For
this reason California's legislation on fine prints, which provides
for treble damages only in some cases,225 and the California droit
de suite22 6 are seldom used by aggrieved parties and may be con-
sidered "show-case" legislation or museum pieces. To make a
lawsuit under the Act worthwhile, attorney's fees should have
219. Note that copyright infringement extends to negligent and even innocent
conduct although there are provisions for relief in the case of innocent infringe-
ment. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 405(b) (Supp. I 1979) (recovery of damages not per-
mitted against infringers who are misled by absence of copyright notice, although
recovery of profits and injunctive relief still permitted).
220. Cf. Sheehan, supra note 21 (discussion of the reasons why artists fail to
learn about or use copyright laws).
221. CAL CirV. CODE §§ 987(e) (1)-(3) (Deering Supp. 1982).
222. Id. §987(e)(3).
223. Id. § 987(e)(4).
224. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 412, 502-05 (Supp. HI 1979) on remedies for the early copy-
right registrant
225. CAL. Civ. CODE § 1745 (Deering 1981).
226. CAI. CIV. CODE § 986 (Deering Supp. 1982) does not even provide for attor-
ney's fees.
been mandatory for the prevailing artist.2 2 7 Further, punitive
damages should have been mandatory for the violator whose un-
justified conduct was "willful, malicious, or intentional." 228 How-
ever, even despite these proposed measures, bringing suit may be
costly and unprofitable for the artist who may only recover attor-
ney's fees. The reason is that actual damage22 9 may amount to
little or nothing.
The artist who has parted with ownership usually cannot estab-
lish damages if the owner or third party destroys the work, be-
cause the work was probably paid for in full and because in most
cases destruction does not cause injury to reputation.230 Of
course, in the unusual case the artist may be able to substantiate
lost copyright and resale royalties when such claims are not spec-
ulative. However, unless the artist can show that he had a con-
tract to exploit the copyright or that the owner had a resale
contract, there is little to claim.231 On the other hand, where the
work has been mutilated so that its display causes injury to the
artist's reputation, damages may be awardable for the same rea-
sons that damages for defamation and disparagement are
granted.232 Such damages, nevertheless, are difficult to prove, and
this type of case is not frequently before the courts.233
Another problem with actual damages is that where the work is
damaged but salvageable the measure of damages may only be
227. See supra text accompanying note 218; of. CA. CIrv. CODE § 1717 (Deering
1971) (defines"prevailing party" for purposes of awarding attorney's fees).
228. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2) (Supp. IH 1979), which provides for higher awards
of statutory damages for copyright infringement where the infringement is "com-
mitted willfully." The word unjustified is employed to rule out liability for inten-
tional acts when the conduct is justified, e.g., where the work is obscene or badly
deteriorated and the artist refuses to repair or remove it.
229. Cf. 3 M. NnnIER, supra note 7, at § 14.02 (computation of actual damages in
copyright cases to include lost sales, decline in value of copyright or of the work
itself, and the time and expense of creating the work).
230. See Diamond, supra note 60, at 256-57; Roeder, supra note 36, at 569.
231. Cf. Paramount Prods., Inc. v. Smith, 91 F.2d 863 (9th Cir. 1937) (damages
awarded for breach of contract to provide screen credit; not speculative). But cf.
Ericson v. Playgirl, Inc., 73 Cal. App. 3d 850, 140 Cal. Rptr. 921 (1977) (breach of
contract damages for failure to use plaintiffs photograph in magazine held specu-
lative); Zovich v. Petroff, 152 Cal. App. 2d 806, 313 P.2d 118 (1957) (no damages for
failure to give screen credit for associate producer of fim).
232. See supra note 78. The artist's paternity rights are violated to the extent
that she is associated with a work which is not truly hers.
233. Cf. Geisel v. Poynter Prods., Inc., 295 F. Supp. 331 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (manu-
facture of allegedly "low quality" dolls based upon plaintiffs cartoon characters
did not defame plaintiff); Morton v. Raphael, 334 flI. App. 399, 79 N.E.2d 522 (1948)
(advertising photographs which depicted plaintiff's mural in background did not
harm plaintiff's reputation); motion picture cases cited supra note 101 (cases illus-
trating reluctance of courts to find defamation.of artist); Diamond, supra note 60,
at 264-65.
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the cost of repair.m4 But how does one establish the cost unless
the artist initially spends the money for repair or submits esti-
mates? Should the artist have the burden of paying for repair
first and hoping for compensation later? With works of art, are
costs of repair a reliable basis for determining actual damages?2 35
And what happens when only the artist can undertake the re-
pairs, resulting only in the expenditure of his own labors? Addi-
tionally, it is difficult to measure actual damages when paternity
rights are involved. Almost always, where there is a failure to
give credit, actual damages cannot be substantiated because the
damages are speculative. 6 Of course, the artist has been in-
jured, sometimes more so than in the case of copyright infringe-
ment. But since punitive damages are not awarded to the artist
under the Act, he is left only with injunctive relief except in cases
involving false attribution in which the artist's reputation is at
stake.23 7
What the legislators might have done with respect to damages
was to have followed the lead of Congress when it enacted the
new Copyright Act and to have provided for a measure of statu-
tory damages which the plaintiff could recover in lieu of actual
damages.23 8 Even the range of copyright awards, $250 to $10,000
234. See 23 CAL. JuR. 3D Damages § 68 (1975).
235. The law of damages with respect to repairs has been stated, in part, as
follows:
Where the property has not been wholly destroyed, the proper measure of
damages for its partial destruction is the difference between its market
value immediately before and immediately after the injury; but if it can be
completely repaired for a lesser sum, the cost of repairing thereupon be-
comes the measure of damages. If the damage cannot be completely re-
paired, the proper measure of damages is the difference between the
property's value before the injury and its value after repairs have been
made on it, to which must be added the reasonable cost of making the
repairs.
23 CA. Jun. 3D Damages § 68 (1975); of. Merchants Fire Assurance Corp. v. Lat-
timore, 263 F.2d 232 (9th Cir. 1959) (insurance valuation case discussing the law as
it concerns repairs and insurance for works of art). As Lattimore illustrates, dam-
age to some works can cause complete loss of value which cannot be restored by
repairs. On the other hand, some repaired works become more valuable just be-
cause they are restored.
236. See Paramount Prods., Inc. v. Smith, 91 F.2d 863 (9th Cir. 1937); Zovich v.
Petroff, 152 Cal. App. 2d 806, 313 P.2d 118 (1957); 3 M. NnFRn, supra note 7, at
§ 14.02 n.24.
237. Cf. CAL CIrv. CODE § 3344 (Deering 1972) (effectively, an adjunct to the Act
for some purposes; it imposes liability for, among other things, using a person's
name in connection with the advertising or solicitation of sales of products or
goods, including works of art, without their consent).
238. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (Supp. II 1979). The amount of statutory damages
(or in special cases, $100 to $50,000), might have been suitable
compensation for the aggrieved artist. Another way to remedy
the problem of destruction or mutilation would have been to con-
strue the defendant's act as one of conversion and to award the
artist the fair market value of the work measured by the value im-
mediately prior to the destructive act.239 This solution would offer
an effective remedy for the artist and might be easier to enforce
in terms of calculating damages. Naturally, the owner who has
paid for the work and has intentionally destroyed it will claim
that it is unfair to pay twice for the same work. Nonetheless, if it
is a unique, original work of art and the owner has not purchased
copyright (as is the case with most sales)240 and must pay resale
royalties, is market value of the work too much as compensation
for the loss of copyright and resale royalties?241
Waiver of Rights
The artist who comes to court may not only have trouble pursu-
ing his remedies but may find that his rights under the Act have
been lost or dissipated because waiver of rights is permitted
under the Act. Subdivision (g) (3) reads:
The rights and duties created under this section: . . .[e]xcept as provided
in paragraph (1) of subdivision (h) [on works of art installed in buildings]
may not be waived except by an instrument in writing expressly so pro-
viding which is signed by the artist.2 4 2
This means that if, as usual, the artist is in a weaker bargaining
position, a waiver can be compelled. Although a comparable pro-
awarded to the plaintiff in a copyright infringement case is within the discretion of
the court, subject to the prescribed limits. If no determination of actual damages
or profits can be made, the court can award the copyright proprietor an amount
which, in its opinion, represents adequate and just compensation. See F.W. Wool-
worth Co. v. Contemporary Arts, Inc., 344 U.S. 228 (1952).
239. See W. PROSSER, supra note 47, at 80-81; CAT. Civ. CODE § 3336 (Deering
1972) on remedies for conversion. Perhaps "fair market value" in this instance
could include the value of the copyright and the discounted value of resale royal-
ties in order to represent the true loss to the artist.
240. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 204 (Supp. 1I 1979) which in practice cause artists to
retain copyright in most cases because they require that the artist only be
divested of copyright by written agreement.
241. Another alternative way of assessing damages may be based upon CAL.
CIV. CODE § 3355 (Deering 1972). It reads:
Where certain property has a peculiar value to a person recovering dam-
ages for deprivation thereof [e.g., under id. § 3336], or injury thereto, that
may be deemed to be its value against one who had notice thereof before
incurring a liability to damages in respect thereof or against a willful
wrongdoer.
Note that ownership of the property is not required, only that the property have a
peculiar value to the person recovering damages for deprivation or injury, which
the artist is permitted to recover under the Act.
242. Apparently no further contractual consideration is necessary for the
waiver to be effective.
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vision exists in the new Copyright Act which permits transfer by
written agreement, 43 the waiver clause is not in accord with the
approach of Civil Code section 986 on resale royalties which effec-
tively bars waiver.244 Additionally, it does not reflect the notion
that moral rights are inalienable because they adhere to and re-
main a part of the author's personality and are not property rights
which can be conveyed.245 Indeed, in some jurisdictions moral
rights are inalienable to a certain extent.246
Nevertheless, in certain circumstances it makes sense to permit
waiver. If the work is created with the understanding that it is to
be destroyed or altered, then the artist should not complain about
injury to the work. Of course, a special provision could have been
made for this latter type of situation, and the general waiver
clause could have been avoided. Problems with commercial
use247 also could have been solved by permitting special waivers
where the works are used commercially.
One source of potential confusion is that the Act appears to per-
mit waiver only by the artist and not by the heirs or personal rep-
resentatives who may bring actions up to fifty years after the
artist's death.248 It could be implied that artist includes heirs and
personal representatives,249 but perhaps the intent was to rule out
bargains between the heirs or representatives and those in pos-
session of the works. The rationale would be that the heirs or
representatives were only erstwhile trustees for the cultural heri-
243. 17 U.S.C. § 204 (Supp. fII 1979); cf. id. at § 101 (copyrights in only certain
types of commissioned works permitted to pass to the party who has commis-
sioned the work if there is a written agreement stating that the work shall be con-
sidered a "work made for hire").
244. CAL. CrV. CODE § 986(a) (Deering Supp. 1982).
245. Art. 6 of the French Law on Literary and Artistic Property of March 14,
1957, 1957 J.0. 2723, 1957 B.L.D. 197, states in part
The author shall enjoy the right of respect for his name, his authorship,
and his work. This right shall be attached to his person. It shall be per-
petual, inalienable and imprescriptible.
246. See Diamond, supra note 60, at 248 n.28 (moral rights qualifiedly inaliena-
ble in certain foreign jurisdictions).
247. CAT_ CIV. CODE § 987(b) (2) (Deering Supp. 1982).
248. Id. § 987(g)(1).
249. Id. states:
The rights and duties created under this section: . . . [sihall, with respect
to the artist, or if any artist is deceased, his heir, legatee, or personal rep-
resentative, exist until the 50th anniversary of the death of such artist.
Perhaps, then, the rights to fully alienate or waive the moral rights devolve upon
the artist's successors in interest. It would be anomalous to prevent the succes-
sors from selling rights which have economic importance. ,
tage.250 But what transpires with a collaborative work? Again the
Act is not explicit with regard to joint authorship. It would seem
anomalous and unfair to let one co-author waive the rights of the
others, and once more the copyright rule is relevant. One co-au-
thor should not be able to convey all existing rights even though
some form of limited licensing may be considered.251 Nonethe-
less, with moral rights the licensing rules should be more restric-
tive because personal feelings and reputation are in the balance,
not merely pecuniary rewards. As a general rule, without the
prior written consent of all other co-authors, one co-author should
not be allowed to license even temporary violations of moral
rights, particularly violations of rights which secure the privacy of
the other co-authors. For these purposes joint authorship should
be defined liberally according to the provisions of the copyright
laws. 252
Works in Buildings
Another way in which artists can lose their rights besides waiv-
ing them is by leaving their works in buildings. The strict rules,
which are understandable from the viewpoint of property owners,
present another obstacle to artists. For works such as murals and
reliefs which cannot be removed from buildings without substan-
tial mutilation or alteration, the artist must secure a written rec-
ognition of his rights under the Act, signed by the owner of the
property.25 3 In addition, the artist must "properly" record the in-
strument, presumably (although it is not mentioned explicitly)
with the county recorder in the county where the building is lo-
cated.254 If properly recorded the document binds subsequent
250. In theory, at least, moral rights should not be subject to waiver to the ex-
tent that they are societal rights which may survive the death of the artist. How-
ever, this proposition awaits the recognition of state action to enforce moral rights
and the balancing of the interests of the heirs versus those of the state. See infra
text accompanying nn. 294-303.
251. See 1 M. NnIER, supra ndte 7, at §§ 6.10, 6.11 on the rights of joint copy-
right owners to license use of the work and to convey interests in the copyright.
252. See supra note 190 for definition of 'Joint work"; 1 M. NnMER, supra note
7, at § 6.03 for definition of 'Joint work" and 'Joint authorship."
253. CAL. Civ. CODE § 987(h) (1) (Deering Supp. 1982). But see CAL. GOV'T
CODE § 15813.5 (Deering Supp. 1980) which grants moral rights to artists who have
works installed in public buildings. Some of these rights are probably inalienable
_and no written reservation is required, although other rights, including reproduc-
tion rights, may be limited by contract under this statute. Cf rules on fixtures set
forth in CAL. Crv. CODE §§ 660, 1013, 1013.5, 1019 (Deering Cal. Civ. Practice Codes
1981).
254. See CAL. Cirv. CODE § 1169 (Deering 1971). It would seem that no type of
registration or recording other than with the county recorder should bind subse-
quent owners. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 27280(a) (Deering Supp. 1982) says that "[any
instrument or judgment affecting the title to or possession of real property may be
recorded pursuant to this chapter [chapter 6 on the county recorder]," and pre-
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owners of the building in relation to the moral rights of the artist.
The first of many difficulties with subdivision (h) (1) on works
left in buildings is that the test of cannot be removed without sub-
stantial damage imposes a heavy burden on owners. Cannot is
too strong a term. In many instances, if the owner expended a
fortune in hiring experts and workmen to delicately remove
works of art which were difficult to excise, then it would be said
that the owner could remove without substantial damage. Per-
haps what the lawmakers wished to express was "cannot be re-
moved without unreasonable expense." If the installed work
decayed or deteriorated to such an extent that its appearance de-
filed the building, there would be other problems with respect to
subsequent owners who were bound by a recorded instrument.
In these cases a statutory burden to repair or remove should have
remained with the artist so that, if the artist refused to repair or
remove, his moral rights would lapse.25 5
Subdivision (h) (1) on works which cannot be removed without
substantial damage was intended to affect cases where the owner
desires to remove the art without the consent of the artist. Sup-
pose the artist does not know about the California Art Preserva-
tion Act or for any other reason does not secure his rights. Did
the legislators mean to give the landlord a free hand to alter or
mutilate the work where removal is not intended? As the statute
reads, the owner can deface without penalty even if removal is
not contemplated because cannot be removed only amounts to an
objective test regarding the status.of the work and not a subjec-
tive test which reflects the intentions of the owner.256 Surely, if
sumably an agreement under subdivision (h) (1) of the Act should qualify for re-
cording. On the other hand, registration of the agreement with the U.S. Copyright
Office under 17 U.S.C. § 205 (Supp. I 1979), which may be a viable option in a few
cases (if the agreement is otherwise recordable with the Copyright Office), is not
mentioned nor should it have the effect of binding subsequent owners who would
not have actual notice of the reserved rights and who should not be said to have
constructive notice of these rights. Cf. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 14700-03 (Deer-
ing 1976) (recording of literary or artistic work with Secretary of State for pur-
poses of protection under state law).
255. The law of nuisance is relevant and analogous because the work may be a
"nuisance" should it deteriorate to the point where it interferes with the use and
enjoyment of the property. The remedies are damages, injunctive relief, and
abatement by self-help. See W. PRossER, supra note 47, at 602-06. A court could
permit destruction, for example, if the offending party failed or refused to repair
the offending work. See Noel, supra note 47, on "aesthetic" nuisances.
256. Cannot be removed only relates to objective external circumstances with-
out reference to the actor's state of mind.
the owner were displeased with the work of art in the building
and wished to remove it, the statute could permit damage during
removal. However, if the work is to remain on display in the
building, no owner should be free to mutilate or distort it. Subdi-
vision (h) (1) should have read like subdivision (h) (2) and should
have begun with the phrase, "If the owner of a building wishes to
remove a work of fine art."
Another problem, not envisioned by the drafters, emerges be-
cause of the language of subdivision (h) (1). If a work of art can-
not be removed without substantial damage and moral rights are
not reserved, are the rights waived not only in cases of removal
and non-removal but also with respect to persons other than the
landlord? This subdivision should have said that the rights "shall
be deemed waived only as against all owners of such building"
and also perhaps as against their tenants. Since this wording is
not present it may be that lessees can deface works of art without
sanctions. In addition, the clause "[s]uch instrument, if properly
recorded, shall be binding on subsequent owners of such build-
ing" should be expanded to read ".... owners of such building
and their respective lessees, licensees, and all other persons."
If the work of fine art can be removed without substantial
harm, then the artist's rights are governed by subdivision (h) (2).
When the owner has diligently but unsuccessfully attempted to
give notice of intent to remove or has given ninety days' written
notice to the artist or his heirs or representatives, the protections
of the Act do not apply if the artist or his heirs or representatives
fail to remove the work or pay for its removal.25 7 Unfortunately,
the mode of service of the notice is not specifically provided in the
Act, and it is not clear whether service should be perfected ac-
cording to other provisions of the Civil Code or the Code of Civil
Procedure which affect interests in real or personal property.2 5 8
The statute should have been explicit. To protect the artist even
personal service or service .by mail, return receipt requested,25 9
should have been mandatory.2 60
257. Under subdivision (h) (2) of CA. Cv. CODE § 987, if the artist or his suc-
cessors remove the work or pay for removal, they may actually get title to it. In
other words, the owner's "wish to remove" may amount to an abandonment. Per-
haps this right to acquire title or possession should also be extended to the Arts
Council should it be the only party willing to incur the expense of removal. See
infra text accompanying notes 262-63 on proposed role for the Council.
258. Cf., e.g., CAI_ Civ. CODE § 1861.18 (Deering 1981) (mode of service of papers
for levy by innkeeper on boarder's property); CAL. CODE CIv. PRoc. § 1162 (Deer-
ing 1973) (mode of service of three-day notice to quit leased premises).
259. Cf. CAL. CODE Crv. PRoc. § 1020 (Deering 1973) (notices that may be given
by registered mail).
260. One problem with the notice requirements of subdivision (h) (2) of CAL.
CMv. CODE § 987 (Deering Supp. 1982) is that there is no indication as to which
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Another ambiguity concerns the ninety-day period for written
notice. This time period seems to apply only to cases in which no-
tice is actually given. Diligence is not governed by this ninety-day
requirement, and apparently two weeks of "diligence" could be
enough according to the Act as it now stands. Subdivision (h) (2)
probably should have mentioned the ninety-day period at the
very beginning of the subdivision in order to affect directly the
diligence required. In the alternative, the Act could have called
for the exercise of reasonable diligence, in some sense following
the law of larceny which imposes liability if the finder of lost
property appropriates it when he has reasonable means to locate
the owner and return the property.261
There is another logical problem with subdivision (h) (2). If the
owner wishes to remove a work of fine art and gives notice or dili-
gently attempts to give notice, the rights under the Act are not en-
forceable if the artist does not remove the work or pay for
removal within a certain time period. However-although the leg-
islators did not intend this-as the Act reads, the owner can wish
to remove, give his notice or attempt to give notice, wait out the
ninety-day period, and then let the work remain with a free hand
to alter it afterwards. The statute does not mention that there is a
waiver only in the event of actual removal. To rectify this anom-
aly subdivision (h) (1) should have read in part:
The rights and duties created under this section shall apply except to
harms resulting from removals after the owner has diligently attempted
without success to notify the artist ... or if he did provide notice....
One saving clause which could have been added to remedy the
imperfections of subdivisions (h) (1) and (2) would require that in
all instances notice regarding removal or other conduct which will
affect the work should be given to the Arts Council. 262 Thus,
heirs or legatees must be served with notice if the artist is dead. Notice served
upon an executor or administrator should suffice if the estate is still subject to ad-
ministration. But is the obligation discharged if notice is given to any particular
heir or legatee if there are numerous heirs or legatees? One heir or legatee who
receives the notice, who may be in league with the owner of the building, may not
perchance be interested in preserving the work thus denying the other heirs or
legatees the opportunity to remove and acquire the work.
261. See R. PERKiNS, PERKINS ON CRnrmmAL LAw 248-53 (2d ed. 1969) with regard
to the law of larceny. This rule of larceny law is analogous because it also affects
unattended or lost property, the owner of which cannot be discerned.
262. The Arts Council mentioned in the text was established under CAL. Gov'T
CODE §§ 8750-56 (Deering Supp. 1982). The broad purpose of the Council is to pro-
mote the arts in California through education, financial support, technical assist-
ance, and other means.
when the artist cannot be located by the owner, the Council could
try to find the artist or could have the right to remove and retain
the work, at the discretion of the Council. Even if the artist or his
successors can be located but cannot afford to pay for removal,
under a revised version of the Act the Arts Council could under-
take removal on behalf of the artist or the people of the State.
The early intervention of the Council could help settle controver-
sies about whether the work can or cannot be removed without
substantial harm and could prevent an arbitrary decision made
by the owner. Furthermore, this role for the Council would follow
the example of Civil Code section 986 which allows the Council to
receive resale royalties on behalf of artists who cannot be lo-
cated.263 Moreover, these proposed powers for the Council would
effectuate the clause in the Act which proclaims the public inter-
est in preserving art.264 It makes no sense to tolerate destruction
without giving the public, through the Arts Council, the right to
take the work for a public collection or, if the artist claims it later
on, to restore it to the artist with compensation by the artist for
the costs of removal. Surely the cost of notice by the owner of the
building to the Council would not be an exacting burden when
compared to the potential loss.
The last subdivision on works in buildings, subdivision (h) (3),
reads as follows:
Nothing in this subdivision [ (h) ] shall affect the rights of authorship cre-
ated in subdivision (d) of this section.
This provision was well-intended and necessary to insure that the
waiver or extinction of the rights to integrity does not affect the
rights of paternity. Apparently it was not inserted to affect the
situations described by subdivision (h) (2) on removals which can
be made without substantial harm (assuming that subdivision
(h) (2) always posits actual removal). Rather, it was employed to
remedy the situation where the rights of the artist expired be-
cause of no written reservation, as described in subdivision
(h) (1). If the work is mutilated and the artist has no right of in-
tegrity, subdivision (h) (3) at least permits enforcement of pater-
nity rights so that the artist can disclaim authorship for a "just
and valid reason."26 5 The opposite right, the right to claim author-
ship, of course, may be meaningless once the rights of integrity
have been lost. Few authors would want to claim authorship for a
mutilated work. In fact, the alterations permitted as a result of
263. CAL. Crv. CODE § 986(a) (2), (4), (5) (Deering Supp. 1982).
264. CAL. Crv. CODE § 987(a) (Deering Supp. 1982), which states that "there is
also a public interest in preserving the integrity of cultural and artistic creations."
265. Id. § 987(d).
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the waiver clause at subdivision (h) (1) destroy the right to claim
authorship because this right depends on the right of integrity.
One other effect of the convoluted subdivision (h) is that the
statute does not impose liability for removal alone, assuming that
removal is achieved without injury to the work. Arguably, re-
moval by itself is not tantamount to physical defacement, mutila-
tion, alteration or destruction, although it may be contended that
placing the work out of context is an alteration forbidden by the
Act. In any case, an action against the owner based upon this
type of alteration may be preempted by the public display right
of the new Copyright Act.2 6 6 Furthermore, even if the removed
work was abandoned by the owner, the owner would not be liable
for damage resulting from natural causes or from acts of third
parties because intention2 67 could not be proven, unless perhaps
the owner knew with substantial certainty that the work would be
damaged.
Duration of Protection
If the artist's work of fine art can traverse the gauntlet of land-
lords,268 commercial use exemptions, 2 69 quality restrictions, 270
and waivers, 271 it may enjoy protection after the artist's death, so
that every living artist in California should be amply satisfied.
The term of protection, life plus fifty years, applies to each work
whenever created.272 Obviously the term of life plusfifty years2 73
266. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(5) (Supp. I 1979) (the copyright owner's exclusive
right to display publicly) which may control because of the effect of the preemp-
tion clause, id. at § 301. The right to "display publicly" would entitle only the
copyright owner to put the work on public display. The only exception to this rule
occurs when the owner of the copyright and the owner of the physical aspect of
the work are not one and the same person. See id. at § 109(b). In that case the
owner of the physical aspect of the work may display publicly. In the moral rights
cases the artist often must oppose the person who owns both the copyright and
the object, and, therefore, the artist may find it difficult to counter the right of the
owner to display in any manner chosen by the owner.
267. CAL. Cirv. CODE § 987(c) (1) (Deering Supp. 1982).




272. Id. § 987(g) (1). Subdivision (j) would otherwise allow for perpetual terms
of protection because of the statement that the Act shall apply to proscribed con-
duct affecting "works of fine art whenever created." The provision on duration,
subdivision (g) (1), would have been improved if it had incorporated some of the
provisions of 17 U.S.C. § 302(a), (b) on duration of protection for joint, anonymous,
and pseudonymous works. Also, presumptions regarding death, as provided by 17
was not accidental. Such is the duration of copyright protection
in the United States 274 and many Berne Convention countries. 2 75
Most importantly, it is the term which signifies rights which are
economic in nature, that is, rights which protect the economic in-
terests of the artist.276 In other words, despite the noble declara-
tion that there is a "public interest in preserving the integrity of
cultural and artistic creations,"277 the Act essentially caters to the
interests of living artists and the property rights of the first few
generations of heirs. It does not preserve or protect antiquities or
works of masters who, at the time of this writing, died before
1932.278 Perhaps those who drafted the statute were relying on
other state laws to permanently shield older works of art. Regret-
tably, Penal Code section 622 and similar criminal statutes which
penalize the destruction of works of art,279 even when coupled
with property laws which provide remedies for destruction,2 80 are
not adequate. The overriding immunity to the reach of these laws
is conferred by private ownership. The owner of a masterpiece
may do as he pleases with the work, and there is no redress even
if the work has great historical value.
The choice of the "economic" term of protection for moral rights
must have important consequences in the same fashion that the
apparent choice of the French theory of resale royalties281 gave
U.S.C. § 302(e), could have been included in the Act so that users of the work
would have some idea about when the heir's moral rights expired.
273. CAL. CIV. CODE § 987(g) (1) (Deering Supp. 1982).
274. 17 U.S.C. § 302 (Supp. I 1979).
275. Berne Convention, supra note 59, at art. 7(1).
276. Cf. Diamond, supra note 60, at 247 (on the dichotomy of pecuniary and
moral rights); dissenting opinion of Bird, C.J., in Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25
Cal. 3d 813, 846-47, 603 P.2d 425, 441-42, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323, 344-45 (1979). The "eco-
nomic" term of protection not only rewards the artist during his lifetime but also
represents a return for the artist's estate for his past labors and perhaps for the
contributions and support of the heirs to his career.
277. CAL. Crv. CODE § 987(a) (Deering Supp. 1982).
278. See supra note 272 with regard to subdivision (j) of the Act.
279. E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 622 (Deering 1971) prohibits the destruction of
works of art in public or private places; CAL. EDuC. CODE § 19910 (Deering 1978)
prohibits vandalism of artistic and literary works in galleries, museums, libraries
and other public facilities.
280. E.g., CAL. Crv. CODE § 3336 (Deering 1972) on remedies for conversion.
281. The legislature, in effect, opted for the French theory of the droit de suite
which regards the "royalty" as a tax on consumption of the resold work. Thus,
CAL. CIV. CoDE § 986 imposes a 5% royalty on gross sales proceeds which may re-
sult in many inequities, especially if resale prices are only slightly higher than
original purchase prices. For example, if the original sales price for a work is $999
and the work is resold for $1,000, the payment of the $50 royalty results in a loss
for the first purchaser. In contrast, the German theory of the droit de suite, em-
bodied in the Italian statute (Law of 22 April 1941, No. 633) and typically "Idealis-
tic," is based upon the notion that when the work is first sold by the artist the
inherent or intrinsic value is not fully recognized; therefore, the artist should be
rewarded later on when the true value of the work, beyond the pittance for which
[voL 19: 675, 19821 Moral Rights
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
direction to the California droit de suite.2 82 Possibly the choice
was dictated by the prevailing importance of the rights of private
owners and public users.283 To have chosen a perpetual term for
moral rights and, thus, to construe them as non-economic rights
of personality or as property rights deserving of lengthier protec-
tion than that of copyright, would have presented quandaries with
regard to enforcement. It also would have represented a serious
interference with the property rights of owners and a disturbing
restriction for public users. Unlike other nations such as the
United Kingdom, 284 the United States does not even have export
statutes which place restrictions on the exportation of national art
treasures, 285 the type of statutes which have been assailed abroad
because of their encroachment on private interests. The Califor-
nia Legislature was willing to confront owners with the needs and
interests of living artists and the first or second generation of
heirs yet, would go no further to allow the people of the state or
the remote descendants of the artist to stand vigil at the owner's
hearth and guard old works of art. The state would superintend
the bellum omnium contra omnes but would not make art res
publica.
Besides the argument for the rights of private owners the inter-
ests of public users must also be considered. Do not perpetual
rights seem absurd in light of contemporary conditions in the
world of art and commerce? As Justice Mosk wrote in his concur-
ring opinion in Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, a case involving pub-
it was first sold, is revealed. The Belgian theory posits a continuing relationship
between the artist and the purchasers of his works. The artist who continues to
create high quality works, thus enhancing the value of all his other works, should
share in the resulting profits. Under both the German and Belgian theories the
artist receives a percentage of the profit made by the reseller. See Hauser, The
French Droit de Suite: The Problem of Protection for the Underprivileged Artist
under the Copyright Law, 6 BuLL. COPYRIGHT Soc'y U.S_. 94 (1959); Sherman, In-
corporation of the Droit de Suite into United States Copyright Law, 18 ASCAP
COPYRIGHT L. Sy ap. 50 (1968).
282. CAT. Crv. CODE § 986 (Deering Supp. 1982).
283. E.g., advertisers, commercial exploiters, and other persons addressed by
CAi. Cirv. CODE § 3344 who use artistic works to make reproductions and to pre-
pare derivative works such as toys and greeting cards.
284. E.g., Import, Export and Customs Powers (Defence) Act 1939, 2 & 3 Geo. 6,
ch. 69 places restrictions on exportation of works of art. For other legislation on
protection of cultural property, see Niec, Legislative Models of Protection of Cul-
tural Property, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 1089 (1976).
285. See L. DuBoFF, supra note 52, at 75.
licity rights and the interests of the heirs of Bela Lugosi in his
portrayal of the Dracula character.
May the descendants of George Washington sue the Secretary of the
Treasury for placing his likeness on the dollar bill? May the descendants
of Abraham Lincoln obtain damages for the commercial exploitation of his
name and likeness by the Lincoln National Life Insurance Company or
the Lincoln Division of the Ford Motor Company? May the descendants of
James and Dolly Madison recover for the commercialization of Dolly
Madison confections?286
At the other extreme, to consider moral rights only as the per-
sonal rights of the artist, akin to the right to privacy, and to let
them expire upon the death of the artist,2 87 would bitterly disap-
point artists and their living heirs who would have desired at
least a short term of posthumous protection. Obviously a balance
had to be struck between perpetual and lifetime rights. Thus, the
term of copyright protection was chosen for moral rights, in the
same way that the dissenters asked for "life plus fifty years" for
the heirs of Lugosi.288
There were, of course, other choices, and differentiations could
have been made between prospective plaintiffs and defendants,
and between the rights in question. For example, a perpetual
term could subsist against all non-owners while a limited term re-
mained against owners. After all, perpetual terms of protection
with enforcement by the heirs are not unknown to the law of in-
tellectual property. Common law copyright extended for a term
which was potentially perpetual,289 and trademark protection may
extend indefinitely.290 With regard to plaintiffs, the heirs as plain-
tiffs could be restricted to the posthumous fifty-year period be-
cause their interests thereafter may be outweighed by those of
owners and users.291 On the other hand, if the rights were
granted to the state, enforcement by public officials could extend
perpetually.
The most noteworthy differentiations could be made based on
286. 25 Cal. 3d 813, 827, 603 P.2d 425, 433, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323, 331 (1979).
287. Other "personal" rights expire upon death; e.g., the right to privacy does
not apply to the deceased. See W. PROSSER, supra note 47, at 815. Neither does
the law of defamation apply to dead persons. Id. at 745.
288. Publicity rights have been denied to heirs in other cases, e.g., Memphis
Dev. Found. v. Factors, etc., Inc., 578 F.2d 1381 (6th Cir. 1980) (the Elvis Presley
case); Frosch v. Grosset & Dunlap, Inc., 75 A.D.2d 768, 427 N.Y.S.2d 828 (1980) (the
Marilyn Monroe case). But see Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836
(S.D.N.Y. 1975) (the Laurel and Hardy case).
289. See 1 M. Nm R, supra note 7, at § 9.01[B]. Common law copyright, for
the most part, was abolished by the preemption clause of the new Copyright Act,
17 U.S.C. § 301 (Supp. 1I 1979).
290. See 1 J. GILSON, supra note 12, at § 4.09 (federal registration may be re-
newed indefinitely so long as the mark continues to be used in commerce).
291. As the numbers of heirs multiply and as they grow more remote from their
ancestor, their individual interests in the work decrease.
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the rights at issue.292 Undoubtedly, the right of anonymity need
not be perpetual and probably should expire at the end of the ec-
onomic term when the second or third generation of heirs may
not be concerned with the attribution of the work to their ances-
tor. However, the affirmative right to credit need not expire, nor
should the right to prevent physical mutilation or destruction. In
other words, although it may be important to make Shakespeare's
name and likeness and copies of his works freely available by ter-
minating publicity rights and copyright, there is no overriding
concern to deprive Shakespeare of credit for his works (notwith-
standing the claims of Bacon's disciples) nor to permit destruc-
tion of extant manuscripts.
Moral rights may be categorized in terms of societal rights for
the public at large and privacy and publicity rights for the indi-
vidual artist.293 The individual's rights are Janus-faced in the
sense that the privacy and publicity rights (or personal and prop-
erty rights) are two sides of the same coin. In essence, publicity
rights (i.e., property rights as distinguished from personal rights)
are economic rights which are bestowed on the artist so that he
may derive income from his labors. The privacy rights (i.e., per-
sonal rights) protect the artist's feelings and solitude. These two
classes of rights and the societal rights are inextricably woven
into the fabric of the droit moral. The right to anonymity, for ex-
ample, is primarily a non-economic right of privacy which shields
the artist from unpleasant incidents resulting from the associa-
tion of his name with a particular work; but it is also economic in
nature insofar as the right may have a fair market value. The
rights to receive credit and restrain false attribution are primarily
292. As Professor DuBoff points out, the rights passing to the heirs in France
are only "negative" in nature. Although the heirs may enforce restrictions and
negative rights, the positive components of the droit moral do not survive. L.
DuBoFr, supra note 52, at 806. This is one possible differentiation which could af-
fect the terms of the rights. See also Strauss, supra note 192, at 517-18:
According to most writers, not all components of the moral right pass to
the author's heirs: the "positive" components die with the author; only
the "negatb.e" ones pass to the heirs. The right to create a work, to pub-
lish it, to change it, to withdraw it from circulation, and to destroy it, are
said to be innate positive components. On the other hand, the right to
prevent others from making changes or from committing acts detrimental
to the author's reputation are considered negative components that re-
quire no personal act by the author and may, therefore, be transmitted to
his heirs.
293. Cf. Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 603 P.2d 425, 160 Cal. Rptr.
323 (1979) (discussing the dichotomy between privacy and publicity rights).
economic rights of publicity; they are also non-economic personal
rights or rights of privacy to the extent that the artist's public ex-
pressions are associated with him and he may be placed in a false
light if credited with the works of another.
Moral rights were originally developed in a society without the
extraordinary means of communication and mass-replication
which prevail today. They were recognized by nineteenth-century
continental jurisprudence as rights of the author's personality.294
More recently, however, these rights have been looked upon not
only as personal rights associated with the right to privacy but as
property rights or publicity rights. As Professor Nimmer said in
discussing the right to publicity:
Without in any way implying the right of privacy is less important today
than when first suggested by Brandeis and Warren [in their pioneering ar-
ticle which first declared the right of privacy] 2 9 5 it is suggested that the
doctrine, first developed to protect the sensibilities of nineteenth century
Brahmin Boston, is not adequate to meet the demands of the second half
of the twentieth century, particularly with respect to the advertising, mo-
tion picture, television and radio industries.296
To the extent that moral rights are property or economic rights of
-the artist created as rewards for his labor, they should be pro-
tected, at least during the life of the artist and for a limited time
thereafter. The economic term, therefore, arguably should apply
to the right to credit, the rights of integrity and disclosure, and
perhaps to the right to use a pseudonym.297 As personal rights or
rights to privacy, the droit moral should perish simultaneously
with the artist, and the heirs should have no right to enforce ano-
nymity. As societal rights, moral rights may be perpetual, and
one may contend that the state should have the right to restrain
mutilation, destruction, and false attribution of artistic works. 298
Is is really unusual to contemplate perpetual public rights in the
work of art? Are not laws protecting historic monuments and
buildings becoming more prevalent?299 Do not other nations
294. See Roeder, supra note 36, at 555-56.
295. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HAnv. L REv. 193 (1890).
296. Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBs. 203, 203 (1954).
297. A number of countries, including West Germany and the Netherlands, rec-
ognize moral rights only for the duration of the copyright term. See Diamond,
supra note 60, at 249 n.31.
298. "Perpetual" protection already exists to some extent. See CAL. PENAL
CODE § 622 (Deering 1971) and CAL EDUC. CODE § 19910 (Deering 1978), which pro-
vide criminal sanctions for destroying works of art; see aivo CAL. CIV. CODE § 1770
(Deering 1981), which prohibits deceptive commercial practices such as "passing
off," disparagement, and misrepresentation of source, sponsorship, approval, con-
nection or association.
299. See, e.g., TAx INCENrVES FOR HISTORIC PRESERVATION (G. Andrews ed.
1980); HISTORIC PRESERVATION LAw: AN ANNOTATED BIBuOGRAPHY (E. Kettler & B.
Reams, Jr. eds. 1976).
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place restraints on the exportation of art?3 00 Once the socializa-
tion of art is acknowledged, and export restrictions and other pub-
lic rights accepted, the only problem is one of enforcement.
Perhaps the legislature would have advanced too far under the
circumstances had it endorsed perpetual rights enforceable by
the state without the consent of the heirs. One reason is that
state intervention could hamper the heirs' ability to exploit the
works of their ancestors. For instance, after the death of the fa-
mous sculptor David Smith, the executor of his estate, Clement
Greenberg, believed that Smith's sculptures which were not deco-
rated with paint would fetch higher prices. If the State of New
York had intervened against Greenberg to prevent him from re-
moving the paint from Smith's sculptures, the heirs would have
had to remain content with lower sales prices.3 01 One way to bal-
ance public rights with the rights of the heirs would have been to
allow the state to enforce perpetual rights only with the consent
of the heirs or only to the extent that they did not conflict with
the economic interests of the heirs.02 Another solution would
have been to permit the interests of the heirs to expire at the end
of the economic term with state enforcement persisting thereaf-
ter. With this latter arrangement state actions during the heirs'
term might be brought with the consent of the heirs or, alterna-
tively, if after due notice of intent to bring suit there was no ob-
jection from the heirs.303 A further choice, although somewhat
impractical, would be to leave the perpetual rights to the heirs
alone. Naturally, in this case if the heirs simply did not exist or
were unwilling or unable to initiate legal proceedings, the moral
rights would be unenforceable. Also, should the heirs become
more numerous with succeeding generations, the perpetual rights
may not be enforceable because of conflicts among the heirs.
The perpetual state interest has the major advantage of protect-
300. See legislation cited by L. DuBOFF, supra note 52, at 75-78.
301. See L. DuBoFF, supra note 52, at 845-46 (discussion of the Smith case).
302. Sometimes moral rights may have to be asserted against the heirs. See,
e.g., Brugnier Rouve c. de Corton (Cour d'appel Paris, 1907), cited in L. DUBOFF,
supra note 52, at 806.
303. The laws of some countries, including Brazil and Portugal, actually provide
that moral rights post mortem shall be entrusted to a public body. See Diamond,
supra note 21, at 249 n.30. As Diamond mentions, this avoids disagreements
among heirs as they become more numerous in successive generations. Cf. Wrr-
FORD COMMrITEE REPORT, supra note 60, at §§ 643-47 (perpetual copyright protec-
tions enforced by public trustees).
ing works of great cultural importance which have inestimable
value to the people of the state. Many important works of art
have been lost forever because of the careless or malicious behav-
ior of persons who destroyed masterpieces. It is amusing to recol-
lect that some of Shakespeare's tragedies were given happy
endings during the eighteenth century and that during the early
nineteenth century Beethoven's music was performed with the
discordant sections removed. Some ccntemporaries, however,
were shocked when Cordelia lived at the end of Lear and when
Beethoven symphonies were edited so that they would sound
more like eighteenth-century works. One only has to recollect the
cries of anguish of Berlioz, upon hearing the altered Beethoven
symphonies, to comprehend what the damaged work must have
been like-and would be like today-had the alterations been al-
lowed to remain.
Further Suggestions for Amendments
When the first draftsman began his sketch of the California Art
Preservation Act he did not sit before a tabula rasa. Facing him
were statute books replete with other laws on art, particularly
California laws.3 04 Many of the weaknesses of the Act could have
been avoided had the Act been integrated with other laws on art,
and a consistent body of "art law" could have been developed in
California. The following are some minor suggestions for coordi-
nating the Act with other statutory schemes.
One way of solving some of the problems of the Act, including
the problems of recordation and proof of recognized quality,
would be to have a system of registration for all protectible works.
Moral rights, copyright, and the right to resale royalties may be
said to overlap or to be species of the same genus, and registra-
tion for copyright would assist with the enforcement of the other
rights. A simple way to proceed without expense to the State
would be to require that each work be registered with the United
States Copyright Office along with the requisite deposits.305 In
addition, recordation of agreements affecting moral rights (e.g.,
regarding waivers) could be made with the Copyright Office (if
the agreements are otherwise recordable there), although the in-
304. E.g., CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 980-86 (Deering Cal. Civ. Prac. Codes 1981) (on in-
tellectual properties and the droit de suite); id. at §§ 1738-38.9 (on artist-dealer re-
lationships); id. at §§ 1740-45 (on fine prints); CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 8750-56 (Deering
Supp. 1980) (on the Arts Council); ici. at §§ 15813-13.7 (on art in public buildings).
305. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 407, 408 (Supp. 1I 1979) (copyright registration and depos-
its of copies with the Library of Congress); 37 C.F.R. §§ 202.19-.21 (1980) (regula-
tions concerning deposits). Of course, artists tend to avoid registering their
claims. See Sheehan, supra note 21.
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strument required by subdivision (h) (1), which relates to works
in buildings, would have to be recorded with the local county re-
corder.306 If such requirements were too onerous, at least an op-
tional copyright registration could create a presumption of
authorship and recognized quality,30 7 thus shifting the burden of
proof to the defendant to impugn authorship or quality.
Registration would help not only with the problems of author-
ship and recognized quality but also with the issues of alteration
and mutilation. If photographs of the work in a pristine state
were already on file with the Library of Congress after registra-
tion, the artist would have less difficulty establishing mutilation
or alteration. Furthermore, potential defendants would be insu-
lated from false claims. For similar reasons, copyright registra-
tion may also have advantages in relation to the collection of
resale royalties. In fact, should works of art become subject to
controls similar to those imposed on firearms and automobiles so
that provenance can always be traced-rather a dreadful possibil-
ity-it would seem logical for the Library of Congress to become
the repository for all submitted documents. 3 08 Although one
judge said that selling a work of art is not like selling a barrel of
pork,309 the growing commercialization of the art world and the
integration of laws on intellectual property make it foreseeable
that art may soon be subjected to controls similar to those affect-
ing other valuable commodities. 3 10
As mentioned above, there are numerous other ways in which
copyright laws could have influenced the Act. For example, lost
copyright royalties could be considered in calculating damages;
306. 17 U.S.C. § 205 (Supp. ElI 1979) provides for recording of agreements which
affect copyrights. See supra note 254.
307. CAL. CIV. CODE § 987(b) (2), (f) (Deering Supp. 1982). The Copyright Act,
17 U.S.C. § 410(c) (Supp. I1 1979), provides that the certificate of registration is
prima facie evidence of the validity of the copyright and the facts stated in the cer-
tificate, e.g., facts concerning authorship, ownership, and publication.
308. There would obviously be a problem with the suggested copyright registra-
"tion if the artist could not register his claim to copyright With the Copyright Office.
For example, this could occur if the artist had already transferred copyright ac-
cording to 17 U.S.C. § 204 or if the copyright were lost as a result of foreclosure on
a copyright mortgage.
309. See opinion of Seabury, J., in Clemens v. Press Publishing Co., 67 Misc.
183, 184-86, 122 N.Y.S. 206, 207-08 (Sup. Ct, App. Tm. 1910).
310. There are already a number of quasi-public registries for art, many of
which use advanced scientific and computerized methods. See I- DuBosF, supra
note 52, at 470-75. Some of these registries, of course, were established to provide
information about provenance, fakes, and forgeries.
statutory damages could be awarded to the artist who cannot
demonstrate actual damages; and the concepts of joint work,
work made for hire, and pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works
could be used in the Act. Not only could the California droit
moral be tied to copyright, but it could be made consistent and
integrated with other art laws. For instance, because paternity
rights should not depend upon the number of copies, the laws on
fine prints 311 could be modified to require that fine prints not be
sold or offered for sale without proper credits. Should paternity
rights apply to fine prints, the artist could be prohibited from
bringing actions against owners where he did not comply with
Civil Code sections 1740-44, which prescribe disclosures in the of-
fer and sale of fine prints.3 12 Also there is no reason for not ex-
tending the rights of integrity to the plates from which fine prints
originate. Even though a plate may not always appear to be a
work offine art its loss or mutilation may be calamitous because
without an undamaged plate there can be no more saleable
prints.
The Act could be integrated with Civil Code section 986 on re-
sale royalties. For instance, those owners who neglect to pay roy-
alties could be deemed to have made unauthorized sales and
would remain responsible for the moral rights violations perpe-
trated by their transferees. Additionally, lost resale royalties
could be a factor in calculating damages under the Act where the
resale value of the work is reduced because of mutilation, altera-
tion, or destruction. Conversely, violations of moral rights which
resulted in lower sales prices could be compensated for by higher
royalties. Thus, the seller who alters or mutilates the work by
selling only a part of it, as for example in the case of Bernard Buf-
fet,313 could be liable for royalties assessed on the fair market
value of the whole work. Perhaps even a statute on resales could
direct that all works be sold intact with proper credits.
Another suggestion is that moral rights could be integrated with
Civil Code sections 1738-38.9 which regulate the relationships be-
tween artists and dealers. These sections of the Civil Code define
the consignor-consignee relationship, 314 allocate the risks of loss
or damage to the work,3 15 and impose certain obligations on the
311. CAL. Crv. CODE §§ 1740-45 (Deering 1981).
312. Some of the disclosures required concern the name of the artist, the year
of printing the edition of fine prints, the number of editions, the number oi prints
in each edition, and the preservation or destruction of the plates.
313. See supra note 99; Merryman, supra note 66, at 1023.
314. CAL. Civ. CODE § 1738.5 (Deering 1981).
315. Id. § 1738.6(c).
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dealer with regard to sales proceeds. 16 Gallery owners are al-
ready strictly liable for the loss or damage to works held on con-
signment even without the Act,317 and this rule could have been
mentioned in the Act in conjunction with the rule regarding fram-
ers, conservers, and restorers.3 18 Where the dealer purchases the
work for resale, possibly the standard of gross negligence should
apply. The dealer, after all, has at least the same professional sta-
tus in relation to the art as that of framers and restorers. In no
event should a work be sold by a dealer without preserving the
artist's paternity rights including the rights to credit and pseudo-
nymity; thus, the dealer should not disclose the artist's true name
or deprive the artist of credit against the artist's wishes. The
dealer is the confidant of the artist and should remain so even if
loyalty means lower sales prices.
Finally, the artist's rights in relation to works in buildings
should be maintained against all non-owners even if there has
been a failure to record in keeping with subdivision (h) (1) of the
Act. Under the California Government Code319 there is already
more complete protection of moral rights for works installed in
public buildings, but this protection should be extended to art in
privately owned buildings by preserving works of art as objects of
historic or artistic interest under statutes protecting historic and
artistic monuments and buildings.320 In this fashion both the art-
ist and the government could be eligible plaintiffs. The govern-
mental action could be one at criminal law or, in the case of a civil
suit, would more likely be an action to protect a work certified to
have historic or artistic interest.
The integration of the droit moral with other laws affecting art
should not be a cumbersome task, especially in jurisdictions
316. Id. §§ 1738.6(d), 1738.7.
317. Id. § 1738.6(c) which reads: "The consignee [i.e., the dealer] shall be re-
sponsible for the loss of, or damage to, the work of fine art."
318. CAL. CIV. CODE § 987(c) (2) (Deering Supp. 1982).
319. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 15813.3(e) (Deering Supp. 1981) imposes a duty on the
State Architect to ensure that works acquired for state buildings be properly
maintained and free from alterations unless permitted by the artist. The same
Code, id. § 15813.5, provides that works acquired for use in public buildings be sub-
ject to the artist's right to claim authorship, right to reproduce the work, and lim-
ited right to a resale royalty.
320. See supra note 299; cf. Finance Act 1976, §§ 77, 85, 124 Finance Act 1975,
§ 31; Finance Act 1965, ch. 25, § 31; Finance Act 1973, ch. 51, § 46; Finance Act 1969,
ch. 32, § 39; (recent United Kingdom legislation affecting "objects of artistic
interest").
which have not committed themselves haphazardly to specific
types of art-related legislation, as has California. The integrated
legislation could be known as "artists' protection acts" in the
same manner that performers in Britain rely on Performers' Pro-
tection Acts.321 To the extent that the separate statutes could be
coordinated with each other, each of the statutory schemes would
be more viable. As the California statutes now stand, they are
like drunken men coming out of a pub; unless they put their arms
around each others' shoulders for support, they will all fall down
as each goes his own way.
Insofar as certain statutes could be incorporated into larger
statutory schemes, the algorithm exemplified by the new Copy-
right Act could be followed. The legislators would then have to
consider separately: (1) the types of artists and works to be pro-
tected;322 (2) the different moral rights involved;323 (3) the owner-
ship of the rights;324 (4) the duration of each of the rights;325
(5) the system of registration or recordation necessary for en-
forcement;326 (6) the remedies for violation of each of the
rights;327 (7) the temporal328 and geographic329 effect of the legis-
lation; and (8) the intersection with other laws.330 The most im-
portant considerations for drafting integrated legislation on moral
rights would be the differences among the rights (e.g., which af-
fect duration, remedies, and enforcement) and the intersections
with other laws.
CONCLUSION
This critique of the California Art Preservation Act has illus-
trated some of the problems besetting legislators who draft laws
relating to art. What mars this legislation is the failure to grant
the full spectrum of moral rights recognized in other countries.
321. Performers' Protection Act 1972, ch. 32; Performers' Protection Act 1963, ch.
53; Dramatic & Musical Performers' Protection Act 1958, 6 & 7 Eliz. 2, ch. 44 (1958).
These Acts provide a limited measure of protection for performing artists by
preventing the commercial exploitation or reproduction of their performances
without their consent.
322. Cf. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-05 (Supp. 1I 1979)- (subject matter of copyright).
323. Id. § 106 (constituent rights of copyright; exclusive rights of copyright
proprietor).
324. Id. §§ 201-05 (ownership and transfer of copyright).
325. Id. §§ 301-05 (duration of copyright).
326. Id. §§ 407-12 (copyright registration, deposits).
327. Id. §§ 501-06, 508-10 (remedies for copyright infringement).
328. Id. §§ 301, 507 (effect of new Copyright Act and limitations on actions for
copyright infringement).
329. Id. §§ 104, 601-03 (copyright protection with regard to author's nationality
or domicile, importation of works made abroad).
330. Id. § 101 (utilitarian works and the relationship of copyright law to the law
of patents); see also note 177 supra.
[VOL. 19: 675, 1982] Moral Rights
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
For instance, the Act does not adequately reflect the importance
of paternity rights because the rights to use a pseudonym, remain
anonymous, and restrain false attribution are not coiipletely en-
forceable. More importantly, the Act reveals an inability to come
to grips with the realities of the world of art and commerce. The
legislators, once they devised their plans, neglected to make their
decrees effective and, for that matter, worthwhile. The clauses
which mention recognized quality, intentionally commit, properly
recorded, and commercial use are unworkable. Moreover, the use
of the words reasonable or timely at certain sections would have
prevented future controversies by setting up objective standards
rather than leaving it to the courts to infer such standards.
In addition to their failure to observe the workings of the real
world, the legislators may not have given sufficient consideration
to the theoretical problems surrounding moral rights. The Act,
which seemingly looks upon the droit moral as a conglomeration
of economic and personal rights, fails for that reason to grant pub-
lic rights in worlds of art and renders moral rights alienable and
limited in duration. In such new areas of the law the legislator
must not only have legs long enough to reach the ground but
every so often must assume the air of the metaphysician. Fur-
thermore, somewhere between theory and practice, in the realm
of legal discourse, the legislators behaved as if they were working
in a vacuum. The new Act could have been interrelated with all
of the other legislation on the arts so that art law in California
would evolve as a cohesive body of law with consistent theory and
practice. In this regard a cursory reading of the Copyright Revi-
sion Act of 1976 would have disclosed many points of cross-refer-
ence, and many terms and concepts could have been borrowed
from the law of copyright so that the Act would have comple-
mented the copyright laws.
Despite these criticisms, the California Art Preservation Act
represents the first major step taken in the United States to join
the community of nations which already recognize the moral
rights of artists and other creators. 331 If the Act merely provides
331. See Roeder, supra note 36, at 557-58. See also H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 47, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5659, 5660 on the
difficulties concerning compliance with the Berne Convention. Despite the failure
of past attempts to legislate moral rights, there is still some hope that the United
States may yet ratify the Berne Convention. See id. at 135, 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS at 5751.
the impetus for national legislation on moral rights32 it will have
served a worthwhile purpose, even though it may never preserve
art in California.
APPENDIX
CAIuFoRNiA ART PRESERVATTON ACT
(a) The Legislature hereby finds and declares that the physical
alteration or destruction of fine art, which is an expression of
the artist's personality, is detrimental to the artist's reputa-
tion, and artists therefore have an interest in protecting their
works of fine art against such alteration or destruction; and
that there is also a public interest in preserving the integrity
of cultural and artistic creations.
(b) As used in this section:
(1) 'Artist' means the individual or individuals who create a
work of fine art.
(2) 'Fine art' means an original painting, sculpture, or draw-
ing of recognized quality, but shall not include work pre-
pared under contract for commercial use by its
purchaser.
(3) 'Person' means an individual, partnership, corporation,
association or other group, however organized.
(4) 'Frame' means to prepare, or cause to be prepared, a
work of fine art for display in a manner customarily con-
sidered to be appropriate for a work of fine art in the par-
ticular medium.
(5) 'Restore' means to return, or cause to be returned, a dete-
riorated or damaged work of fine art as nearly as is feasi-
ble to its original state or condition, in accordance with
prevailing standards.
(6) 'Conserve' means to preserve, or cause to be preserved, a
work of fine art by retarding or preventing deterioration
or damage through appropriate treatment in accordance
with prevailing standards in order to maintain the struc-
tural integrity to the fullest extent possible in an un-
changing state.
(c) (1) No person, except an artist who owns and possesses a
work of fine art which the artist has created, shall inten-
tionally commit, or authorize the intentional commission
332. A recent attempt to legislate moral rights was the bill by Representative
Drinan of Massachusetts, a bill to amend the Copyright Revision Act of 1976 enti-
tled the 'Visual Artists Moral Rights Amendment," HR. 8261, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.(1977).
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of, any physical defacement, mutilation, alteration, or de-
struction of a work of fine art.
(2) In addition to the prohibitions contained in paragraph
(1), no person who frames, conserves, or restores a work
of fine art shall commit, or authorize the commission of,
any physical defacement, mutilation, alteration, or de-
struction of a work of fine art by any act constituting
gross negligence. For purposes of this section, the term
'gross negligence' shall mean the exercise of so slight a
degree of care as to justify the belief that there was an
indifference to the particular work of fine art.
(d) The artist shall retain at all times the right to claim author-
ship, or, for just and valid reason, to disclaim authorship of
his or her work of fine art.
(e) To effectuate the rights created by this section, the artist may
commence an action to recover or obtain any of the following:
(1) Injunctive relief.
(2) Actual damages.
(3) Punitive damages. In the event that punitive damages
are awarded, the court shall, in its discretion, select an
organization or organizations engaged in charitable or ed-
ucational activities involving the fine arts in California to
receive such damages.
(4) Reasonable attorneys' and expert witness fees.
(5) Any other relief which the court deems proper.
(f) In determining whether a work of fine art is of recognized
quality, the trier of fact shall rely on the opinions of artists,
art dealers, collectors of fine art, curators of art museums,
and other persons involved with the creation or marketing of
fine art.
(g) The rights and duties created under this section:
(1) Shall, with respect to the artist, or if any artist is de-
ceased, his heir, legatee, or personal representative, exist
until the 50th anniversary of the death of such artist.
(2) Shall exist in addition to any other rights and duties
which may now or in the future be applicable.
(3) Except as provided in paragraph (1) of subdivision (h),
may not be waived except by an instrument in writing ex-
pressly so providing which is signed by the artist.
(h) (1) If a work of fine art cannot be removed from a building
without substantial physical defacement, mutilation, al-
teration, or destruction of such work, the rights and du-
ties created under this section, unless expressly reserved
by an instrument in writing signed by the owner of such
building and properly recorded, shall be deemed waived.
Such instrument, if properly recorded, shall be binding
on subsequent owners of such building.
(2) If the owner of a building wishes to remove a work of fine
art which is a part of such building but which can be re-
moved from the building without substantial harm to
such fine art, the rights and duties created under this sec-
tion shall apply unless the owner has diligently at-
tempted without success to notify the artist, or, if the
artist is deceased, his heir, legatee, or personal represen-
tative, in writing of his intended action affecting the work
of fine art, or unless he did provide notice and that per-
son failed within 90 days either to remove the work or
pay for its removal. If such work is removed at the ex-
pense of the artist, his heir, legatee, or personal represen-
tative, title to such fine art shall pass to that person.
(3) Nothing in this subdivision shall affect the rights of au-
thorship created in subdivision (d) of this section.
(i) No action may be maintained to enforce any liability under
this section unless brought within three years of the act com-
plained of or one year after discovery of such act, whichever
is longer.
(j) This section shall become operative on January 1, 1980, and
shall apply to claims based on proscribed acts occurring on or
after that date to works of fine art whenever created.
(k) If any provision of this section or the application thereof to
any person or circumstance is held invalid for any reason,
such invalidity shall not affect any other provisions or appli-
cations of this section which can be effected without the inva-
lid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of
this section are severable.
